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THE COURT: [1]n order to finalize this case, we're required to 
waive your appeal rights. Do you, in fact, waive your appeal 
rights? 
MR. OGUL [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, that has not been 
part of the negotiation. 
THE COURT: It's got to be. 
MR. OGUL: It has never been made a part of the negotiation. 
THE COURT: Wait, wait. Let's not argue about it, Mr. Ogul. 
MS. BACKERS [prosecutor]: It's part of the deal. 
THE COURT: Every felony plea I've been taking in here for 
the last six months-he has to waive his appeal rights. If Mr. 
Cameron does not want to waive his appeal rights, we do not 
have a disposition, and I'm sending the case back to Judge Mc-
Kinstry. That's the way it is.1 
Plea bargaining2 is the bedrock upon which modem criminal jus-
tice practice rests. Its evolution as the predominant model of criminal 
case adjudication has resulted in a system where criminal trials are the 
exception rather than the rule-a trial court model based almost ex-
clusively on negotiation rather than litigation.3 In recent years, a rela-
tively new feature of plea bargaining practice has emerged which now 
threatens to render appeals nearly as rare a phenomenon as trials 
have become under the old model. This new aspect of the practice-
which is illustrated by the extract above-is the increasingly prevalent 
requirement that a criminal defendant waive the right to appeal as a 
condition of any plea bargain. 
Since more than eight out of ten criminal cases are disposed of by 
some form of plea arrangement,4 the inevitable consequence of such 
widespread insistence upon appeal waivers will be the removal of an 
enormous percentage of criminal cases from appellate review. The 
doors of the trial court could gradually close to scrutiny from above 
and we could find ourselves moving one step closer to an administra-
tive model of criminal case resolution in which neither factual nor 
1. People v. Cameron, No. 101512, slip op. at 2-3 (Alameda County Super. Ct. May 
17, 1991) (Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing). 
2. Plea bargaining has been defined as "the exchange of prosecutoriaI, judicial or 
other official concessions for pleas of guilty." Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role 
in Plea Bargaining, Part J, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1059 n.1 (1976) [hereinafter Judge's 
Role]. . 
3. Although figures vary, most sources estimate that 85% to 90% of criminal cases 
are disposed of by some form of plea bargain. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CoNVICI10N: THE 
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE Wrrn:OUT TRIAL 3 n.1 (Frank J. Remington 
ed., 1966); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ. 
1909,1909 n.1 (1992); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS. 
TICS 502 table 5.25 (Kathleen McGuire et al. eds., 1990). 
4. See supra note 3. 
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legal issues are resolved by the courts, but rather by the parties 
through a process of negotiation. This development conflicts with our 
traditional notion that judicial safeguards are needed in the applica-
tion of penal sanctions and should be examined thoroughly before we 
signal assent. 
Appeal waivers are not an entirely new entry upon the plea bar-
gaining scene.s In fact, reported cases adjudicating the validity of such 
waivers date back to United States Supreme Court approval of the 
plea bargaining system itself.6 Despite this pedigree, such waivers 
were often described as "uncommon"7 and "not a widespread prac-
tice"8 for most of their early development, and case law on the subject 
was sparse.9 
Appeal waivers are far from "uncommon" today. In many juris-
dictions, judges10 and prosecutorsll routinely insist upon such waivers 
as a virtual precondition to plea bargaining. Elsewhere, one finds 
open advocacy on the part of appellate COurts12 and prosecutors13 for 
5. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 512 P.2d 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Butler, 
204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Ramos, 292 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 
1968). 
6. The turning point in U.S. Supreme Court treatment of plea bargaining is generally 
understood to be the so-called "Brady trilogy": Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790 (1970). In these three companion cases, the Supreme Court gave full approval to the 
practice of plea bargaining for the first time, concluding that it is "inherent in the criminal 
law and its administration." Brady, 397 U.S. at 75t. 
7. People v. Fearing, 442 N.E.2d 939, 940 (III. App. Ct. 1982). 
8. People v. Nichols, 493 N.E.2d 677, 680 (TIL App. Ct. 1986). 
9. Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 329. Some early legal literature addressing the phenomenon 
did appear. See, e.g., Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Crimi-
nal Defendant's Express Waiver of Right to Appeal as Part of Negotiated Plea Agreement, 89 
A.L.R.3d 864 (1979); Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants' 
Waiver of the Right to Appeal-An Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or 
Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 649 (1990); Edmund F. Schmidt, Note, Criminal 
Procedure-Plea Bargaining-Implicit Restrictions on Defendant's Right to Appeal, 21 
WAYNE L. REv. 1161 (1975). 
10. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 1; People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S2d 140, 141 
(App. Div. 1992) (quoting the trial judge in that case as saying, "I normally insist on [an 
appeal waiver] on [sic] the price of my plea agreement"). 
11. Rex Bossert, U.S. Defenders in Battle Over Appeal Waivers, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 1, 
1993, at 9 (describing a policy of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern 
District of California requiring appeal waivers in all negotiated misdemeanor cases and a 
large percentage of negotiated felony cases) [hereinafter U.S. Defenders]; Spiros A. 
Tsimbinos, Conditioning a Plea or Sentence Agreement on a Waiver of Appellate Rights, 
N.Y.L. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 4 ("Prosecutors throughout [New York] State ... have moved to 
obtain waiver of appeals in as many cases as possible."). 
12. See, e.g., People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) ("Prosecutors 
and trial judges can do something about [frivolous criminal appeals] and we encourage 
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increased reliance upon appeal waivers as a solution to crowded ap-
pellate calendars and what is perceived to be a glut of frivolous crimi-
nal appeals. The practice is not without its detractors, however. 
Recently, the policy of the United States Attorney for the Northern 
District of California of insisting upon appeal waivers in most plea 
dispositions resulted in a short-lived, but highly publicized, boycott of 
indigent appointments by the local defense bar.14 Nonetheless, waiver 
of the right to appeal is becoming a dominant feature of plea bargain-
ing practice. 
This Article explores the legal and constitutional issues raised by 
appeal waivers. Section I analyzes the current state of the case law. 
Section II explores the due process challenge to appeal waivers, and 
concludes that such a challenge would be difficult to sustain given the 
current state of due process law. It, nonetheless, goes on to suggest 
that a key premise of due process theory as it relates to plea bargain-
ing-the presumed equality of bargaining power between the prosecu-
tion and the defense-may be ripe for challenge. Section ill discusses 
the public policy arguments for and against appeal waivers, and argues 
that the public policy debate has been unduly skewed in favor of 
caseload concerns, without giving sufficient consideration to the es-
sential role that the right to appeal plays in the criminal justice system. 
Section III argues that appeal waivers should either be disapproved or 
given very restricted scope. Finally, Section IV explores the particular 
problems raised by waivers of sentencing error. It concludes that 
waivers of future sentencing error are very difficult to reconcile with 
them to do so . . .. [T]hey should consider obtaining the defendant's waiver of the right to 
appeal as part of the negotiated plea."). 
13. See, e.g., Roger W. Haines, Jr., Waiver of the Right to Appeal Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENT. R. 227 (1991). The author, an assistant U.S. Attorney 
in San Diego, California, argues that appeal waivers are lawful and that they represent a 
"proper and sensible" way of responding to the vastly increased criminal appellate work-
load that federal courts have experienced in the wake of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984. fd. at 227. 
14. Bossert, U.S. Defenders, supra note 11, at 1, 10; Rex Bossert, Conflict Panel With-
draws in Appeal Dispute, L.A. DAlLY J., Mar. 4, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Conflict]; Howard 
Mintz, Northern District May Face a Plea Bargain Showdown, THE RECORDER, Mar. 4, 
1993, at 1. The dispute centered around a bank robbery case, United States v. Foster, No. 
92-0625DU (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1993). Bossert, Conflict, supra, at 10. In Foster, the de-
fendant negotiated a plea which did not resolve whether or not the defendant was a career 
offender-a sentencing issue which, if resolved against the defendant, could have more 
than doubled his sentence. fd. The U.S. Attorney insisted upon a waiver of the right to 
appeal any sentencing error as a condition of the plea bargain. Bossert, U.S. Defenders, 
supra note 11, at 9. The Federal Public Defender assigned to the case resigned in protest. 
fd. at 1. Forty-two private attorneys subsequently refused appointment in the case. Bos-
sert, Conflict, supra, at 10. 
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traditional definitions of knowing waiver or with the basic policies 
which inform the right to appeal. This section urges that even if ap-
peal waivers are upheld generally, such approval should not extend to 
waivers of prospective sentencing error. 
I. Current State of the Law on Appeal Waivers 
A. Issues Which can be Raised on Appeal After a Guilty Plea 
Absent an Appeal Waiver 
A preliminary question to ask is why we are discussing appeal 
rights at all, given that the defendant has pleaded guilty. A counseled 
guilty plea, that is both voluntary and intelligent, is an admission of 
factual guilt that has been traditionally viewed as removing that issue 
from the case. IS In fact, in a series of United States Supreme Court 
cases beginning with the Brady trilogy,16 and culminating in Tollett v. 
Henderson,17 the Court has held that, by entering a plea of guilty, a 
defendant forfeits a broad range of potential legal and constitutional 
appellate claims that would otherwise have been available had the 
case gone to trial. As the Court said in Tollett, "[w]hen a criminal 
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights 
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. "18 
What issues then may a defendant raise on appeal after a guilty 
plea; or, to cast the question in the terms of this Article, what appel-
late remedies are still available to a defendant, after a guilty plea, that 
15. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975). 
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). 
17. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
18. Id. at 267. Note that the Tollett line of cases does not itself rest on a principle of 
waiver. See, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983) ("[T]he conclusion that a 
Fourth Amendment claim ordinarily may not be raised in a habeas proceeding following a 
plea of guilty does not rest on any notion of waiver, but rests on the simple fact that the 
claim is irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction."). Indeed, any attempt to 
reconcile Tollett with the traditional definition of waiver set out in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege"), seems doomed to failure. See Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 
Term, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 
1, 8 (1970). For this reason, this article will refer to the operative effect of Tollett and its 
progeny as the "forfeiture" of appeal rights. If a defendant has appeal rights that have not 
been automatically forfeited by his or her guilty plea per Tollett, then we face the specific 
issue addressed by this article: whether these remaining rights may be waived in return for 
some consideration as part of a plea bargain. 
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could be the subject of waiver? There appear to be roughly five broad 
categories of such claims. 
First, there are potential issues arising from the entry of the guilty 
plea itself-whether, for example, the plea was knowing and volun-
tary and whether defendant received adequate assistance of counsel in 
entering the plea. Tollett makes clear that these issues survive a plea 
of guilty.19 Quite simply, reliance on the plea to foreclose appellate 
review cannot be countenanced if the plea itself is invalid. Thus, it 
must always be open to the defendant to show that the plea was defec-
tive. As will be shown below, a number of courts have held that this 
first category of issues also survives an appeal waiver.2o 
Second, despite the broad language of McMann v. Richardson21 
and Tollett, the Court has made clear that there are certain constitu-
tional claims that survive a guilty plea even though the alleged error 
took place prior to the entry of the plea. Such issues are typified by 
the due process claim considered in Blackledge v. Perry,22 which the 
Court found to be so fundamental that it "went to the very power of 
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him. "23 These claims include constitutional issues 
such as the double jeopardy claim in Menna v. New York,24 which the 
Court found to survive a plea of guilty because it was "not logically 
inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt.,,25 Legal 
scholars have vigorously debated the meaning and exact contours of 
these exceptions to the Tollett rule.26 For the purposes of this Article, 
19. 411 U.S. at 267. Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993); State v. Gibson, 
348 A.2d 769, 774 (N.J. 1975); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (N.Y. 1989). 
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
22. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). In Blackledge, the defendant was charged with a more serious 
offense after exercising his right to trial de novo under a state statute. The Court held that 
the potential for vindictiveness in such a situation was so great as to violate due process 
and that this due process claim could be raised on appeal even though the accused had 
pleaded guilty to the more serious charge. Id. at 28-29. 
23. Id. at 30. 
24. 423 U.S. 61 (1975). 
25. Id. at 63 n.2. 
26. Note, for example, the exchange between Professors Westen and Saltzburg: Peter 
Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Crim-
inal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and 
the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REv. 
1265 (1978); Peter Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1308 
(1978). See Tigar, supra note 18; Robert N. Shwartz, Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of 
"Present but Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1435 (1974). See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The De-
Fall 1995] WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 133 
however, it is sufficient to acknowledge that such exceptions exist, and 
consequently provide defendants with appellate rights as to certain 
antecedent constitutional violations, which can, in turn, become the 
subject of plea bargains for their waiver. 
Third, there are specific issues that can be raised on appeal after a 
plea in those states which have created statutory exceptions to the 
Tollett rule. For example, in California and New York, a defendant 
may raise suppression issues on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that 
the judgment is predicated upon a plea of guilty.27 The Supreme 
Court has, in turn, determined that states are free to carve out such 
legislative exceptions to the Tollett rule, and that when they do, the 
defendant may have access to federal habeas corpus as well as the 
direct appeal, in spite of a guilty plea.28 
Where such appeal rights are granted by statute, they often ac-
count for a significant percentage of appeals arising in that state. For 
example, a recent study by the National Center for State Courts found 
that appeals from guilty pleas and other nontrial dispositions averaged 
between 14% and 25% of all appeals in states which do not provide an 
exception to the Tollett rule.29 In contrast, appeals from nontrial dis-
positions in certain California and New York appellate districts 
amounted to 43% of the total dispositions for each state.30 Both New 
York and California courts have ruled that these statutorily granted 
appeal rights may be the subject of bargained-for waiver.31 These rul-
ings are among the more significant of the appeal waiver cases be-
cause of the number of potential cases affected. 
Yet another category of potential appeal waiver cases includes 
those in which an appeal waiver is taken in the absence of an actual 
gUilty plea. 1\\'0 examples are illustrative: in the first, the defendant is 
convicted at trial and then conducts sentence bargaining which in-
cludes an appeal waiver;32 in the second, the defendant has two cases 
fense Attorney, and The Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter The 
Supreme Court]; George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful 
Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REv. 193 (1977). 
27. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1538.5(m) (West 1993); N.Y. CruM. PROC. LAW § 710.20(1) 
(McKinney 1995). 
28. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 291-93 (1975). 
29. NAT'L CrR. FOR STATE CoURTS, UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMI-
NAL ApPEALS 31, 44 n.8 (1989) [hereinafter NCSC]. 
30. Id. 
31. People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Charles, 217 Cal. 
Rptr. 402, 409 (Ct. App. 1985). 
32. See, e.g., Bunnell v. Superior Ct., 531 P.2d 1086, 1093 (Cal. 1975); Cubbage v. 
State, 498 A.2d 632, 633 (Md. 1985); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (N.Y. 1989). 
\ 
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pending and gets convicted after trial in one while plea bargaining in 
the other for a combined sentence disposition.33 In both situations 
there has been no guilty plea in the case in which the defendant wishes 
to raise appellate issues. Thus, those issues survive the forfeiture rules 
of Tollett and are available on appeal unless the defendant specifically 
waives them.34 
The last category is by far the most significant and involves the 
vast array of sentencing issues that may potentially be the subject of 
postplea appeals. It is a procedural fact of life that if there is sentenc-
ing error, it will follow, rather than precede, the plea. Therefore, the 
forfeiture rule of the Tollett line of cases will not operate to preclude 
appeals in cases involving sentencing error. Perhaps of equal impor-
tance, the range of potential sentencing issues has increased exponen-
tially in recent years with the advent of complex determinate 
sentencing schemes that have been adopted in the federal system35 as 
well as in many states.36 
The appeal of sentencing issues thus represents a "growing 
trend.'>37 A recent study found that 
Sentencing issues were raised in one quarter of the appeals [that 
were the subject of this study], and it appears that sentencing 
issues are not simply 'add-on' issues to appeals that would 
otherwise have been filed; a great number of appeals were filed 
raising only sentencing issues. In addition, sentencing issues 
have a high error rate. In fact, when sentencing is raised, the 
appellate court finds error 25 percent of the time.38 
See also People v. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (Ct. App. 1993). Nguyen was submitted on 
the preliminary hearing transcript. Although tantamount to a plea, such a "slow plea" 
does not come within the forfeiture rules of Tollett. Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 291. 
33. See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 493 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v. 
Fearing, 442 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
34. It has been argued that it is particularly unfair to uphold appeal waivers in this 
class of cases because the defendant has maintained his innocence throughout in the dis-
puted case. This argument has received a mixed reception. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 
775-76 (holding that "a defendant who has never admitted his guilt should, as we view the 
interests of justice and appropriate policy considerations, not be deemed to have irrevoca-
bly waived his right of direct appeal from a conviction unless he fails to file an appeal 
within the time provided therefore by law"); Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1026 (finding "no basis 
for distinguishing" the guilty plea situation from the one where defendant has steadfastly 
maintained his innocence). 
35. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988),28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
98 (1988). 
36. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1168-1170.6 (West 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
paras. 1005-8-1 to 1005-8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 
(Bums 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)-(3), 70.02, 70.06, 220.00-43 (McKinney 1987). 
37. NCSC, supra note 29, at 8. 
38. Id. at 8. 
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Given the confluence of these three factors-the immunity of 
sentencing issues from the Tollett forfeiture rules, the wide range of 
potential sentencing issues, and the relatively high rate of success 
these claims meet on appeal-it is perhaps not surprising that the 
pressure to waive appellate rights is most intense in the area of sen-
tencing appeals, or that a high percentage of the recent reported cases 
have included the issue of appeal waivers.39 
B. Current Case Law on Appeal Waivers 
There has been a sharp increase in reported cases dealing with 
appeal waivers over the past several years at both the state and fed-
erallevels. The cases range from broad challenges to appeal waivers, 
to specific procedural and interpretive challenges, and can be grouped 
in the following categories. 
1. Per Se Challenges 
A substantial majority of state40 and federal41 courts which have 
considered appeal waivers have upheld them against broad per se 
challenges. Some of these courts have upheld such waivers without 
the benefit of any real supporting analysis.42 Others have limited their 
inquiry simply to whether the waiver was free and voluntary, and did 
not examine the more basic question of whether such waivers should 
be permitted at all.43 Most, however, have examined the underlying 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942 (1992); People v. 
Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (Ct. App. 1993); Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1990); People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1992). 
40. Gwin v. State, 456 So. 2d 845 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); People v. Charles, 217 Cal. 
Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1985); Staton v. Warden, 398 A.2d 1176 (Conn. 1978); People v. Fear-
ing, 442 N.E.2d 939 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Weatherford v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 882 
(Ky. 1986); Cubbage v. State, 498 A.2d 632 (Md. 1985); State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385 
(N.H. 1990); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1989); White v. State, 833 S.W.2d 
339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1987); Blackburn v. State, 
290 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1982). Cf Karnezis, supra note 9. 
41. Appeal waivers have been upheld in all but one of the federal circuits which have 
considered them: United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942 (1992); Johnson v. United 
States, 838 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1988). Compare Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 
718 (1st Cir. 1966) (disapproving of appeal waivers in dicta because they "put a price on an 
appeal"). 
42. See, e.g., Rivera, 971 F.2d at 896. 
43. Gwin, 456 So. 2d at 847; People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 684 (N.Y. 1975). See 
also State v. McKinney, 406 So. 2d 160, 162 (La. 1981) ("extensive 'boykinization'" assures 
that waiver is free and voluntary). The latter reference is to the procedural requirements 
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public policy issues with at least some care before coming to the con-
clusion that appeal waivers pass constitutional muster.44 
A common line of reasoning in cases upholding appeal waivers 
begins with the observation that "nearly every right, constitutional or 
statutory, may be waived."45 Judicial approval of plea bargaining in 
general is necessarily predicated upon a determination that the consti-
tutional right to jury trial may be waived in exchange for inducements 
such as a reduction in the charge or sentence.46 Since the right to 
appeal is generally not regarded to be of constitutional dimension,47 
of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), for ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing and 
voluntary. 
44. However, many of these same courts fall out in considerable disarray over more 
specific application questions, such as whether certain issues should be beyond the reach of 
appeal waivers, see infra text accompanying notes 93-101; what will render a waiver un-
knowing or involuntary, see infra text accompanying notes 70-71; and what procedural re-
quirements should attend the taking of such waivers, see infra text accompanying notes 
102-113, to name a few. 
45. Cubbage, 498 A.2d at 634. This concept that most rights are subject to waiver finds 
frequent articulation throughout the case law. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 
S. Q. 797, 801 (1995); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935 n.12 (1991). For example, 
it has been held that a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive: the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Boykin, 
395 U.S. at 243; the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
819 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938); the Sixth Amendment rights to 
jury trial and confrontation, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, and the statutory right to pursue civil 
rights claims against government officials, Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392-
98 (1987). 
46. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 ("[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State 
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State ... 
by his plea .... "). 
47. Over a century ago, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that the right 
to appeal was not "a necessary element of due process of law." McKane v. Durston, 153 
U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Although a majority of the Court has continued to hew at that line, 
see, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), some justices have, in recent years, chal-
lenged that accepted wisdom. Id. at 756 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If the question 
were to come before us in a proper case, I have little doubt ... that we would decide that a 
State must afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions .... "). Moreover, a 
spate of recent legal literature has developed, calling for a rethinking of this question. See 
Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. 
REv. 503 (1992); Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 
YALE L.J. 62 (1985); Harry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 54 JUDICATURE 296 (1971); Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CoRNELL 
L. REv. 603 (1985); David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in 
American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518 (1990); Alex S. Ellerson, 
Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 373 
(1991). This past term, the Court issued an opinion which suggests the issue may, in fact, 
be ripe for reconsideration. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Q. 2331 (1994), the 
Court held that, at least in certain civil contexts, the right to judicial review is compelled by 
the due process guarantee. Id. at 2334. This opinion, as well as the larger question of 
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most courts reason that "if defendants can waive fundamental consti-
tutional rights such as the right to counsel, or the right to jury trial, 
surely they are not precluded from waiving procedural rights granted 
by statute."48 One commentator has observed that "[t]he reasoning of 
those courts which invalidate pleas conditioned on defendant's agree-
ment to waive his right to appeal seems curiously at odds with the 
widely-accepted theoretical underpinnings of the plea bargaining 
system."49 
The other major thread of reasoning nmning through the cases 
upholding appeal waivers is a sweeping public policy analysis which 
points to a broad array of perceived benefits that flow from the inclu-
sion of such waivers more or less equally to both the state and the 
accused.50 The benefits to the state are described variously as some 
combination of finality, 51 economy52 and the prompt settlement of liti-
whether the right to appeal in criminal cases might have constitutional stature, is explored 
further, infra, in the text accompanying notes 209-224. Although all 50 states provide ap-
pellate review in some form, Arkin, supra, at 513-14, only a few grant the right as a matter 
of constitutional prerogative. Even in those states, courts have found that the right may be 
waived like other constitutional rights. Fearing, 442 N.E. 2d at 941; Perkins, 737 P.2d at 
251. 
48. Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th 
Cir. 1989». Similar language may be found in United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 
567 (5th Cir. 1992); Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321; People v. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
445,448 (Ct. App. 1993); Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 405; Gibson, 348 A2d at 777 (Schrei-
ber, J., concurring) and Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024, to name a few. 
49. JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 5.14,5-29 (2d ed. 1983). 
50. United States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d 1037, 1040; Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 405 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). Cf. AB.A STANDARDS FOR CruMINAL JUSTICE Standard 21-
2.2(c) emt., (1980) (urging that appeal waivers are beneficial to all parties and are, there-
fore, "entirely proper"). 
51. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829 ("Waivers of appeal in plea agreements preserve the finality 
of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of guilty."); Navarro-Botello, 
912 F.2d at 322 ("The most important benefit of plea bargaining is the finality that 
results."). 
52. At the heart of this argument is frequently a perception that the system is 
overburdened with criminal appeals, most of which are frivolous. See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal. 
Rptr. at 819. This perception and its factual bases are addressed in greater detail, infra, in 
the text accompanying notes 337-422. Many courts are quite frank about the cost-savings 
aspect of plea bargaining in general and appeal waivers in particular. See, e.g., Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d at 322 ("plea bargaining saves the state time and money"); Gonzalez, 981 
F.2d at 1040 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The assurance that the plea won't be set aside on 
appeal enables the prosecutor to cut short the time and other resources she will devote to 
the case."). This viewpoint received perhaps its most unvarnished articulation in Seaberg, 
where the court opined that "if full trials were required in each case New York's law en-
forcement system would collapse." 541 N.E.2d at 1024. Whether a similar observation 
might be made about the dangers inherent in full utilization of defendant's appeal rights, 
one California court attempted to compute the costs of the average "criminal appeal with 
no meritorious issues" at approximately $6,000 and extrapolated from this figure that "if 
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gation.53 The major benefit to the defendant is viewed as an increase 
in plea bargaining leverage which provides the accused with another 
important bargaining chip to bring to the plea negotiation table.54 
This observation is sometimes coupled with the warning that contrary 
rulings would cut down on incentives for prosecutors to offer induce-
ments in general,55 In addition, defendants are also perceived as ben-
efiting in much the same way as the government benefits from the 
certainty that such a process promises.56 
While the majority of courts considering the matter have upheld 
appeal waivers, a minority of jurisdictions have refused to uphold 
them in any form. Two separate lines of reasoning recur in these 
cases: first, that the use of such waivers impermissibly chills the right 
to appeal in violation of due process,57 and second, that such waivers 
violate public policy. The public policy rationale most frequently ar-
ticulated is the need to prevent the parties in the criminal process 
only five percent of these appeals fall into the 'frivolous' category those 285 cases result in 
an unnecessary cost to the taxpayers of $1,710,000 a year." Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
53. See Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024 ("[B]argains fairly made should signal an end to 
litigation, not a beginning .... "). Cf. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775 ("We do not share the view 
that there is an affirmative public policy to be served in fostering appeals. . .. 'The settle-
ment of litigation ranks high in our public policy.'" (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 168 
A.2d 72, 74 (N.J. 1961), cert. denied, 171 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1961)}. 
54. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Criminal defendants usually 
have few enough bargaining chips; sparing the government the time and expense of a trial 
and appeal is the primary currency in which they must deal."). Cf. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 
775. 
55. People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Mich. a. App. 1991) ("It stands to 
reason that a party to agreements voluntarily entered into, but consistently repudiated by 
means of appeal, might become wary of entering into such agreements."). Cf. Gibson, 348 
A.2d at 775; Perkins, 737 P.2d at 251. 
56. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320 ("Whatever appellate issues might have 
been available to Navarro-Botello were speculative compared to the certainty derived 
from the negotiated plea with a set sentence parameter."). 
57. The most frequently cited case for this proposition is People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 
325 (Mich. a. App. 1972), where the court invalidated an implicit appeal waiver because 
of its "chilling effect on the right to appeal." Id. at 330. An implicit appeal waiver is a 
bargain that indirectly achieves a waiver of appeal rights, by means of a stipulation that 
one charge will be dismissed only after the appeal period had expired on the disputed 
charge. Butler, in tum, relied upon dicta in People v. Harrison, 191 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 
1971), and Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966), which strongly con-
demned the practice as "constitutionally obnoxious," Harrison, 191 N.W.2d at 374, and 
"unfair," Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718. Butler also relied upon People v. Ramos, 292 
N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1968), which found the practice to be "tantamount to a denial of 
defendant's right to appeal." Id. at 940. (Ramos was overruled, sub silentio, by Seaberg, 
541 N.E.2d at 1022.) 
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from insulating themselves from all review,58 although sometimes the 
matter is merely asserted without the benefit of any real analysis.59 
Those jurisdictions which have invalidated appeal waivers differ 
dramatically on the remedy they will provide. Some simply allow the 
appeal to go forward,60 others void the conviction,61 while still others 
allow the appeal to proceed but give the prosecutor the option of 
voiding the plea bargain.62 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on 
this issue directly, the Court's opinion in United States v. Mezzanatt063 
strongly suggests that the current Court would approve present appeal 
waiver practice if the matter were to come before it.64 
Prior to Mezzanatto, Town of Newton v. Rumery65 was frequently 
cited as bestowing the High Court's official blessing upon negotiated 
appeal waivers. However, that case is of questionable precedential 
value because Rumery was concerned with release dismissal agree-
ments66 and the Court distinguished that type of arrangement from 
traditional plea bargains.67 More importantly, Justice O'Connor's 
critical concurring vote was premised on a requirement that the gov-
ernment would bear the burden of proving that such release agree-
ments were "voluntarily made, not the product of prosecutorial 
overreaching, and in the public interest."68 Her concurrence empha-
sized the need for actual proof on this issue and cautioned against 
presuming validity in any given case.69 If the Court were to impose 
similar proof requirements on the government in every case in which 
58. State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768, 769 (Ariz. 1979). Cf. Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 330. 
The continuing authority of Butler is called into some question by an opinion from a differ-
ent panel of the same Michigan court of appeal which examines each of the separate bases 
underlying the Butler opinion and rejects them as "at odds with the widely accepted under-
pinnings of the plea bargaining system." Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 291. 
59. See, e.g., Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
60. See, e.g., id. at 1068. 
61. See, e.g., Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 325. 
62. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775. 
63. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (approving the prosecutorial practice of soliciting waivers of 
the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11 (e) (6) as a condition of plea bargaining). The implications of the Mezzanatto opinion 
are discussed in greater detail, infra, in the text accompanying notes 218-224. 
64. [d. at 802. 
65. 480 U.S. 386 (1987). 
66. These are agreements in which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal 
charges. 
67. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393 n.3. 
68. [d. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
69. [d. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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it wished to rely upon a waiver of appeal rights, those waivers would 
lose much of their docket clearing magic. 
2. Challenges to the Voluntariness of the Waiver and to Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Advising as to the Plea 
Virtually all courts agree that despite an appeal waiver, defend-
ants remain free to raise on appeal any issue which goes to the validity 
of the plea or the waiver itself. For example, there is general agree-
ment that a defendant will not be precluded from appealing issues 
pertaining to the knowing and voluntary character of the plea or ap-
peal waiver.1° Thus, in United States v. Baty, where the defendant 
asked the court to explain a written plea agreement which set forth 
the appeal waiver and, where the trial court declined to do so, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that the waiver was not knowing and volun-
tary.71 In contrast, where the record has revealed full disclosure and 
an eyes-open decision by the defendant, courts usually have no prob-
lem upholding the voluntariness of the waiver.72 
As a corollary, there appears to be general consensus that an ac-
cused may raise the question of adequate assistance of counsel in 
making the waiver. One case directly holds that such a claim can be 
raised as a basis for setting aside the waiver, thereby rejecting the ar-
gument that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can only be 
raised in a collateral proceeding.73 Several other cases suggest in dicta 
that such claims may be made, but theorize that they are more appro-
priately brought as part of a collateral attack. For example, United 
States v. Abarca74 holds that an appeal waiver also operates as a 
waiver of rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except for claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counseF5 Thus, this holding supports the general 
principle that ineffective assistance issues are not waived, but is silent 
on whether they could be used to challenge the waiver on appeal. 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1992); People v. Vargas, 
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 445, 449 (Ct. App.1993). Currently, a controversy surrounds the question 
of whether prospective waiver of future, unknown sentencing error can ever be viewed as 
an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Rutan and Navarro-Botello hold that it can. Vargas and 
People v. Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Ct. App. 1993), hold that it cannot. This issue is 
discussed in detail, infra, in Section N. 
71. 980 F.2d at 978-79. 
72. See, e.g., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 318. 
73. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 985 F2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993). 
74. 985 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1993). 
75. Id. at 1014. 
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Judge Kozinski, in his United States v. Gonzalez 76 dissent, indicated 
that ineffective assistance challenges may be made but must be limited 
to section 2255 motions.77 Finally, the district court in United States v. 
Kuh[18 provided a particularly confusing message. In a case where it 
was clear that both the prosecution and defense counsel had erred in 
calculating the correct sentencing guideline range,79 the court held 
that defendant's appeal waiver also constituted a waiver of any collat-
eral attack under section 2255.80 What is confusing about this holding 
is that the court repeated the received wisdom that ineffective assist-
ance of counsel can be challenged on collateral attack, but then ig-
nored the fact that defendant's claim was largely based on ineffective 
assistance grounds when it dismissed defendant's section 2255 claim.8! 
3. Challenges that the Sentence Imposed was in Violation of the Plea 
Bargain 
Another category of appeals which are traditionally permitted, 
despite a general waiver of appeal rights, include issues of whether 
there has been compliance with the bargain. Since much of the rea-
soning supporting appeal waivers is grounded in notions of contract 
law,82 there is wide agreement that "the defendant always retains the 
right to complain that the sentence was in excess of the bargain .... 
Otherwise, a deprivation of that bargain might arise, for which the 
waiver of appeal was presumably part of the quid pro quO."83 Failure 
to comply with the terms of the bargain has alternatively been viewed 
by at least one federal court as undennining the voluntariness of the 
76. 981 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992). 
77. Id. at 1043 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting). 
78. 816 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1993). 
79. Id. at 626. 
80. Id. at 628. 
81. Id. at 628-30. 
82. See, e.g., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493. See also Gibson, 348 A.2d at 784-85 
(pashman, J., dissenting); People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 532 (App. Div. 1988). Ven-
tura is discussed, infra, in note 325. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) 
("[W)hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecu-
tor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must 
be fulfilled."); United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993). Contra Peo-
ple v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791 (N.Y. 1974) ("Application to plea negotiations of con-
tract law is incongruous. The strong public policy of rehabilitating offenders, protecting 
society, and deterring other potential offenders presents considerations paramount to ben-
efits beyond the power of individuals to 'contract."'). 
83. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. Cf. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1038. But see id. at 
1042 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) (arguing that such claims should only be heard if the failure 
to comply has first been challenged in the trial court by way of motion or objection); 
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320. 
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plea, with the court coming to the same conclusion on appealability as 
those courts which rely on contract principles.84 
4. Invalidity of Waivers Involving Nonsentencing Issues 
Some states have upheld appeal waivers in general, but have 
found waivers involving certain enumerated rights to be invalid. For 
example, in New York an accused may not waive speedy trial claims,8s 
or claims that challenge the legality of a sentence or the defendant's 
competency to stand tria1.86 The rationale behind these rulings is that 
those legal protections have to do, not only with the fairness to the 
accused, but also with the "fairness in the process itself and, therefore, 
a defendant may not waive them."87 At least one State Bar has deter-
mined that it would be unethical for either the defense attorney or the 
prosecutor to negotiate a waiver of allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counselor of prosecutorial misconduct.88 
5. Appeals Challenging the Sentence Imposed 
As noted earlier, courts generally permit challenges alleging that 
the sentence imposed was in violation of the plea bargain.89 However, 
the issue which has led to the greatest division is whether other sen-
tencing error may be waived as part of a waiver of appeal rights. 
Roughly five different approaches can be gleaned from these cases. 
Minnesota has gone the farthest by holding that all sentencing 
error is immune from negotiated appeal waivers.9o A Minnesota ap-
pellate court has concluded that the combination of an unconditional 
statutory right to appeal all sentencing error plus the statutorily de-
84. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d at 52. 
85. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025. 
86. People v. Callahan, 604 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1992) (citing People v. Annlin, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 691). 
87. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025. This principle that there are some rights which impli-
cate the very fairness of the system and which therefore cannot be waived is encountered 
in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CoDE § 3513 (West 1988) ("Anyone may waive 
the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public 
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement."). However, such provisions are 
normally interpreted quite narrowly. In fact, section § 3513 has been read as creating a 
presumption in favor of waiver in the normal case. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior 
Ct., 124 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859 (Ct. App. 1975) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, any per-
son may waive the advantage of a law intended for his benefit (CIV. CODE § 3513)."). 
88. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Canon 
VI, 129 (Michie 1993). 
89. See supra Section 1(B)(3). 
90. Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
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fined role of the courts under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines91 
requires a determination that normal theories of waiver should not 
apply to sentencing error: "'Vindication of the Guidelines' stated 
goals of establishing 'rational and consistent sentencing standards' of 
reducing sentencing disparity, and providing uniformity in sentencing 
requires appellate review of trial court sentencing decisions."92 
A number of jurisdictions, including New York,93 California,94 
and some federal courts,95 hold that claims of illegal sentencing may 
be raised despite an appeal waiver. To reach this conclusion, these 
courts have employed a rather narrow definition of an illegal 
sentence.96 
Most federal courts take the very expansive position that all sen-
tencing error, except for illegal sentences, may be waived despite the 
fact that the nature and dimensions of the possible error were un-
known to the defendant at the time of the plea and appeal wavier.97 
These cases have explicitly rejected the contention that, consistent 
with Johnson v. Zerbst, a defendant cannot waive an unknown right.98 
By way of contrast, California courts have taken virtually the opposite 
position, holding that defendants cannot waive unknown, prospective 
sentencing error, at least without an explicit statement that this is be-
ing waived.99 
Lastly, a number of state courts, including those in California 
which would otherwise not allow waiver of future sentencing error, 
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West 1995). 
92. Ballweber, 457 N.W.2d at 217. It is interesting to note the similarity between the 
content and goals of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. See UNITED STATES CoMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL (1992). The text accompanying notes 271-289, infra, explores whether the pOlicies 
underlying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines require a conclusion similar to that of the 
Ballweber opinion regarding appellate review of sentencing error. 457 N.W.2d at 217-18. 
At least one California court has opined in dicta that sentencing error cannot be waived. 
Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.2. However, at least three other California cases hold to the 
contrary. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446; People v. Brown, 
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353 (Ct. App. 1994). 
93. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025. 
94. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494 (holding that acts beyond the court's jurisdiction 
cannot be waived). 
95. See, e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829. 
96. Callahan is careful to distinguish between challenges that go to the legality of the 
sentence or the power of the court to impose sentence and claims which are "addressed 
merely to the adequacy of the procedures the court used to arrive at its sentencing determi-
nation." 604 N.E. at 112. The latter are waiveable; the former are not. 
97. See, e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 572; Navarro-Botello, 912 
F.2d at 320. 
98. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320. 
99. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451; Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-26. 
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will uphold sentencing appeal waivers when the bargain includes an 
agreement between the parties for a specific sentence.100 In these 
cases, the courts reason that the defendant cannot complain when he 
has received precisely that for which he has bargained.10l 
6. Requirement that the Trial Judge Specifically Address the Defendant 
Concerning Waiver of Appeal Rights 
A current area of specific controversy in federal courts concerns 
whether the trial judge must personally address the accused about any 
appeal waiver as part of the court's obligation under Rule 11.102 In 
United States v. Wessells',103 the Fourth Circuit held that a written ap-
peal waiver would not operate to prevent the accused from appealing 
an improper application of the sentencing guidelines where "the tran-
script of Wessells' Rule 11 hearing before the district court reveals 
that the court did not question Wessells specifically concerning the 
waiver provision of the plea agreement,"104 and where other evidence 
indicated defendant's waiver was not knowing and voluntary. lOS On 
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. DeSantiago-Marti-
100. See, e.g., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494-95. 
101. See, e.g., People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (App. Div. 1992). 
102. Rule 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, in part, that "the 
Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the 
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the 
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement." FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11 (d). 
Incidental to the Rule 11 controversy is a dispute over whether an appeal waiver can 
be viewed as free and voluntary when the trial court fails to comply with the requirement 
of Federal Rule 32(c)(5) that it advise the defendant of the right to appeal his sentence. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(5). Actually, this issue has arisen with both a positive and a nega-
tive spin-with courts having to consider alternatively whether compliance or noncompli-
ance with the Rule could undermine the voluntary quality of an appeal waiver. Both 
contentions have been rejected. The argument that compliance with the Rule could invali-
date a waiver is premised on the reasoning that a defendant cannot make a knowing waiver 
of a right the court tells him he still retains. The Fifth Circuit rejected such an argument in 
Melancon, relying on the fact that the court's statement came nearly four months after the 
plea agreement, and could not have influenced the defendant's decision to plead. 972 F.2d 
at 568. Similar problems could be avoided in the future simply by not only complying with 
the notice provision of Rule 32, but by going on to explain that this is what is being waived. 
In United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the reverse argument, declining to adopt defendant's contention that, in order to 
make the waiver of the right to appeal a knowing one, the court was required to comply 
with the Rule 32 mandate that the accused be informed that he had such a right in the first 
place. [d. at 583. 
103. 936 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991). 
104. [d. at 168. 
105. [d. 
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nez106 explicitly held that "a Rule 11 colloquy on the waiver of the 
right to appeal is not a prerequisite to a finding that the waiver is 
valid."107 The dissenting opinion objected that the majority was per-
mitting "the district court to shirk its duties under Rule 11 and Rule 
32(a)(2) when a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal a sentence is 
contained in a plea agreement."108 
This issue is not limited to the federal courts. Recently, in People 
v. Castrillon,109 a California appellate court held that a properly exe-
cuted written waiver form may be relied upon as a sufficient showing 
of a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to appeal.110 This issue 
is not new to guilty plea practice. Over a decade ago, the California 
Supreme Court held that reliance upon a written waiver form was suf-
ficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate of Boykin v. Alabama, 111 
while the United States Supreme Court has urged that in these sorts 
of inquiries, "[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be 
controlling. "112 
On a related front, another California appellate court has re-
cently held that a waiver of appeal rights, which does not include a 
specific advisement to the accused of the existence of such appeal 
rights, is not a knowing and intelligent waiver and is therefore 
invalid.113 
7. Appeals by the Government 
At least one federal court has interpreted such appeal waivers by 
the defendant as necessarily containing an implicit mutuality provision 
which would bar appeals by the government as well.114 Despite the 
fact that the plea agreement in that case applied on its face only to 
prevent appeals by the defendant, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a sen-
tencing appeal by the government on the grounds that it would be "far 
too one-sided to construe the plea agreement to permit an appeal by 
106. 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992). 
107. Id. at 583. 
108. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
109. 278 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1991). 
110. Id. at 123. 
111. 395 U.S. 238 (1969), cited in, In re Ibarra, 666 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Cal. 1983). 
112. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 n.20 (1969) (citing Kennedy v. 
United States, 397 F.2d 16, 17 (6th Cir. 1968». See also infra text accompanying note 441. 
113. People v. Rosso, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 221 (Ct. App. 1994). 
114. United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299, 1299 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
977 (1992). 
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the government ... but not to permit an appeal on similar grounds by 
the defendant."115 
ll. The Due Process Issue 
The early cases which struck down appeal waivers often did so on 
due process grounds,116 This rationale was derived from a series of 
United States Supreme Court cases that began with Griffin v. Illi-
nois117 and continued with Rinaldi v. Yeager,118 North Carolina v. 
Pearce,119 and Blackledge v. Perry.120 
Griffin and its progeny invalidated a variety of different state 
practices, all of which were viewed as violating due process because 
they placed an impermissible burden on the right of a defendant to 
appeal a criminal conviction.121 As formulated in Pearce, a central 
tenet of due process doctrine as it pertains to appeals is that "[a] court 
is 'without right to ... put a price on an appeal. A defendant's exer-
cise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered."'122 
A. Do Appeal Waivers Impermissibly "Chill" the Right to Appeal? 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of lower courts in the 
early 1970s found bargained-for appeal waivers to violate due pro-
cess.l23 It would certainly seem that such waivers result in a price be-
115. Id. at 1299. One commentator has criticized the Fourth Circuit's attempt in 
Guevara to rewrite the plea agreement and has suggested an alternative solution wherein 
"neither party should be barred from an appeal unless both have explicitly waived that 
right." D. Randall Johnson, Giving Trial Judges the Final Word: Waiving the Right to Ap-
peal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 71 NEB. L. REv. 694,724 (1992). 
116. See supra note 57. 
117. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding due process requires indigent defendants receive a free 
trial transcript for appeals). 
118. 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (invalidating a state statute that required only defendants sen-
tenced to prison to reimburse the state for the costs of their trial transcripts). 
119. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (invalidating the practice of vindictively imposing greater 
sentences on retrial following a successful appeal). 
120. 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (invalidating a practice of bringing more serious charges when-
ever a defendant exercised a statutory right of trial de novo as a means of "appealing" a 
misdemeanor conviction). 
121. Id. at 28-29. 
122. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718). 
123. As recently as 1990, a law review note contended that the Griffin line of cases 
compelled such a conclusion. Dyer & Judge, supra note 9, at 669. Cf. Paul D. Borman, 
The Chilled Right to Appeal from a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 663 (1974); Schmidt, supra note 9, at 675. 
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ing placed on the right to appeal.l24 If one defendant get,s less time in 
exchange for waiving the right to appeal, then the defendant who in-
sists upon exercising the right must inevitably get more, and that 
amount "more" is the price of an appeal. 
Such reasoning has, of course, been challenged. Judge Bazelon, 
in his now famous opinion addressing a similar argument with respect 
to plea bargaining at trial, was of the belief that: 
Superficially it may seem that . . . the defendant who insists 
upon a trial [and] is found guilty pays a price for the exercise of 
his right when he receives a longer sentence than his less ven-
turesome counterpart who pleads guilty. In a sense he has. But 
the critical distinction is that the price he has paid is not one 
imposed by the state to discourage others from a similar exer-
cise of their rights, but rather one encountered by those who 
gamble and lose . . . . To the extent that the bargain struck re-
flects only the uncertainty of conviction before trial, the "ex-
pected sentence before trial"-length of sentence discounted by 
probability of conviction-is the same for those who decide to 
plead guilty and those who hope for acquittal but risk conviction 
by going to trial. 125 
Of course, this is not an argument that there is no price for asser-
tion of the right but rather an argument that the price is a rational one 
set by the relevant market. The question remains whether such a 
price-rational or otherwise-should exist. 
Moreover, the price may not be a rational one. It seems reason-
able to assume that the prosecutor is most likely to offer significant 
concessions for the waiver of appeal rights when the defendant has 
colorable issues on appea1.126 Why else would the prosecutor offer 
concessions of any magnitude for waiver of the right? But if this is 
correct, does it remove from the appellate docket those cases we 
would most like to see go away? As one commentator has observed 
with regard to trial bargaining: 
If somehow it were possible to have one purified form of plea 
bargaining to the exclusion of another, most observers probably 
would prefer the form that eliminated from the trial process the 
cases in which trial would serve no apparent purpose rather than 
124. The trial judge in People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1992), certainly 
understood it that way when he told the defendant, "J normally insist on [an appeal waiver] 
on [sic] the price of my plea agreement." Id. at 141. 
125. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
126. Some cases suggest that appeal waivers will occur mostly where "the defendant has 
no real interest in an appeaL" Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819. However, it is difficult to see 
why such a defendant would be offered very much by way of concessions. 
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the form that left for trial the cases in which there is nothing to 
try.127 
At the appellate level, a rational system would likewise remove from 
appellate review those cases which are patently frivolous rather than 
those which are viewed as having colorable issues. 
Proponents of appeal waivers often counter this argument by as-
serting that virtually all criminal appeals are frivolous. l28 Such a con-
tention is generally not born out by the statistics.129 This issue is 
explored in detail in the following section. 
However, such a discussion must be viewed as more or less aca-
demic because even if one were to obtain universal agreement that a 
major effect of all appeal waivers is to burden or "chill" the right to 
appeal, under current case law this would still not compel a conclusion 
that due process has been violated. In recent years, the Supreme 
Court has emphatically abandoned the "rights-burdening" reasoning 
of the Griffin line of cases. Perhaps the clearest statement of this ap-
pears in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,Bo where the Court explicitly rejected 
the contention that a "chilling effect" upon the right to appeal, in the 
absence of proof of vindictiveness on the part of the court or prosecu-
tor, could establish a due process claim.131 Instead, the Court read 
North Carolina v. Pearce as intimating "no doubt about the constitu-
tional validity of higher sentences in the absence of vindictiveness de-
spite whatever incidental deterrent effect they might have on the right 
to appeal."132 
Guilty plea cases such as Brady v. United States,133 Parker v. 
North Carolina,B4 and North Carolina v. Al/ord,135 where the Court 
upheld waivers of the right to jury trial that were entered as part of a 
traditional plea bargain in order to avoid potential imposition of the 
death penalty, strongly underscore the point that mere discourage-
ment or "chilling" of the exercise of a fundamental right will not be 
viewed by the Court as a violation of due process, particularly when it 
arises in a plea bargaining context. It is difficult to imagine anything 
127. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 
694 (1981). 
128. See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. 
129. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5. 
130. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). 
131. Id. at 29. 
132. Id. Cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 
(1970). 
133. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
134. 397 U.S. 790 (1970). 
135. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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more potentially "chilling" upon the free exercise of the right to jury 
trial than a threat that one may be executed for choosing to exercise 
that right. Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that "the imposi-
tion of these difficult choices [will be] upheld as an inevitable attribute 
of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotia-
tion of pleas."136 
This affirmation of plea bargaining in even its most coercive con-
texts flows from the Court's crucial underlying thesis that plea bar-
gaining is ultimately a voluntary process characterized by a give and 
take between parties who possess relatively equal bargaining 
power.137 Indeed, the Court itself has noted that "acceptance of the 
basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any 
notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply 
because it is the end result of the bargaining process.,,138 
As a result, the early cases invalidating appeal waivers on due 
process "chill" theory139 simply cannot be squared with current due 
process doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court. Thus, cases 
which reject this due process argument such as United States v. 
Navarro-Botello,140 United States v. Wiggins,141 and Cubbage v. 
State,142 must be judged more faithful to the Court's current position 
on this issue. 
B. The Doctrine of ''Unconstitutional Conditions" 
Before leaving the "chill" line of cases entirely, it must be noted 
that the stark rejection of the rights-burdening theory in some of the 
later plea bargaining cases is difficult to reconcile with another strain 
of due process case law to which the Court continues to adhere (albeit 
in somewhat inconsistent fashion)-namely, the murky doctrine of 
"unconstitutional conditions."143 This doctrine posits that "even if a 
state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it 
136. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31. 
137. Parker, 397 U.S. at 809. 
138. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
139. See supra note 57. 
140. 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990). 
141. 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990). 
142. 498 A.2d 632 (Md. 1985). 
143. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 
1413 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1988); Seth 
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 
U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984). 
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cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'co-
erce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights."l44 
The failure of the Court to address appeal waivers in particular or 
plea bargaining in general in light of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions probably derives from two factors. First, the doctrine is 
viewed classically as applying to indirect burdens upon the exercise of 
fundamental rights. Plea bargaining involves, by contrast, direct bar-
gaining for the waiver of such a right. Although this might be viewed 
as a stronger case for application of the doctrine, the fact that plea 
bargaining does not fit its classic contours might explain why the 
Court has not addressed the question of whether the doctrine compels 
a contrary result in this context. 
The more likely explanation, however, is that "the rhetoric of the 
cases ... and the commentary [has been] overwhelmingly dominated 
[by an approach which] locates the harm of rights-pressuring condi-
tions on government benefits in their coercion of the beneficiary."14s 
Conditions placed upon the receipt of benefits are more likely to be 
found unconstitutional when they render involuntary the choice to 
forego the benefit. Such an approach is ill-suited to application to 
plea bargaining because, as noted above, current theory dictates that 
the plea bargaining process reflects an arms-length transaction in 
which the defendant is totally free to accept or reject the govern-
ment's offer.146 
c. What About Vindictiveness? 
The very cases which abandoned the rights-burdening approach 
of Pearce emphasized nonetheless the need for a process free from 
vindictiveness. As stated by the Court in Blackledge, "[t]he lesson 
that emerges from Pearce, Colton, and Chaffin is that the Due Process 
Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment 
upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likeli-
hood of 'vindictiveness.'''147 
However, even if one could say that the "chill" line of cases meta-
morphosed into "vindictiveness" theory as a central tenet of due pro-
cess analysis, this line of case law similarly offers little solace to 
opponents of appeal waivers. 
144. Epstein, supra note 143, at 6·7. 
145. Sullivan, supra note 143, at 1419. 
146. The correctness of the theory supporting this assumption is explored later in this 
section. 
147. 417 U.S. at 27. 
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The vindictiveness cases held that prosecutors or judges violate 
due process if they use their charging or sentencing powers to punish a 
defendant for exercising rights otherwise guaranteed by law. For ex-
ample, in Blackledge, the prosecutor was found to have violated due 
process by refiling felony charges after the defendant had exercised 
his statutory right to a trial de novo after a misdemeanor conviction 
for assault.148 The opportunities for vindictiveness in such a situation 
were viewed as being so great as to require a presumption that the 
defendant was being punished for the exercise of his rights under the 
statute. 149 
It might similarly be argued that a prosecutor who bargains for 
the waiver of appeal rights presents an equally unacceptable potential 
for vindictiveness. Although the prosecutor is unlikely to be driven by 
a personal animus to punish the accused, cases such as Blackledge 
make it clear that the prosecutor's larger institutional interest in 
avoiding "increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources"150 can 
be sufficient to raise a presumption of vindictiveness. It is precisely 
this interest in conserving resources that motivates a prosecutor who 
attempts to barter charge or sentence concessions for reductions in 
her appellate caseload. 
Nonetheless, such an extension of Blackledge to the appeal 
waiver context must fail because the Court has been quite unequivo-
cal in its declared intent to distinguish plea bargaining practice from 
the rille established in the vindictiveness line of cases.151 The most 
explicit statement of this intent appears in United States v. Good-
win,152 in which the Court held that "changes in the charging decision 
that occur in the context of plea negotiation are an inaccurate mea-
sure of improper prosecutorial 'vindictiveness. "'153 
The Court's rationale for such separate treatment of plea negotia-
tions has been variously stated,154 but at its core is the same assump-
148. [d. at 27-2B. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. at 27. 
151. See supra notes 132-136. 
152. 457 U.S. 368 (1982). 
153. [d. at 379-80. 
154. Professor Schulhofer has, for example, identified four different factors which the 
Court has invoked at different times to distinguish plea bargaining from other settings 
which present the potential for vindictiveness: (1) the advance warning of increases in 
charges that occur in the plea context which is viewed as placing the defendant in a better 
position to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer, (2) the presumption that the prosecutor's 
motivation is less likely to be dictated by personal self-vindication in the plea context, (3) 
the assessment that the prosecutor's institutional interests are more legitimate in the plea 
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tion about the nature of plea bargaining that characterizes its due 
process cases in general-i.e., the view that there can be "no such ele-
ment of punishment in the 'give and take' of plea negotiation[s] so 
long as the accused 'is free to accept or reject the prosecution's of-
fer,"'155 and a defendant will be viewed as such a free actor because of 
the "relatively equal bargaining power" of the parties.156 
Thus, we see that the Court has distinguished plea bargaining 
from several different strains of due process analysis-"chill" theory, 
"vindictiveness" theory, and the doctrine of "unconstitutional condi-
tions"-each of which might present significant questions about the 
validity of appeal waivers. Central to this separate treatment in each 
instance has been the Court's core assumption that plea bargaining 
takes place on a level playing field-that it is a negotiating process 
characterized by arms-length transactions between parties who enjoy 
"relatively equal bargaining power.,,157 
Whether this is an apt description of the plea process is open to 
serious question. Some commentators reject the "mutuality of advan-
tage" characterization, arguing instead that fear of heavier sentences 
after trial makes "[t]he right to reject the proposed plea bargain ... 
largely chimerical."158 Others contend that "'[p]lea bargaining' is in 
reality the prosecutor's unilateral administrative determination of the 
level of the defendant's criminal culpability and the appropriate pun-
ishment for him,"159 and that observations to the contrary are nothing 
more than "glib statement[s]."160 Certainly it is fair to guess that the 
defendant in People v. Cameron,161 whose plea colloquy began this 
Article, felt that he had no practical alternative but to accept the 
judge's condition of an appeal waiver.162 Similarly, it would seem that 
context than in the retrial context, and (4) the belief that the pretrial context of plea bar-
gaining makes it less likely that the prosecutor will be motivated by improper factors. Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1091 n.178 
(1984). 
155. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378. 
156. Parker, 397 U.S. at 809. 
157. Id. 
158. Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARv. 
L. REv. 564, 579 (1977). 
159. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 37,38. 
160. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
161. People v. Cameron, No. 101512, slip op. at 2-3 (Alameda County Super. Ct. May 
17,1991). 
162. Of course, it could certainly be said that Mr. Cameron had an alternative. He 
could have refused to waive his appeal rights and thereby given up the benefit of the bar-
gain he had separately negotiated with the prosecutor. The choice was his. But one could 
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the defendant in People v. Ramos,163 who was faced with the alterna-
tive of waiving his appeal rights or rejecting the plea bargain and ex-
posing himself to the death penalty was correctly described by the 
court as having his range of choices so constrained that "it could not 
[be] reasonably contemplated that defendant would exercise his 'op-
tion' to appeal."l64 
Having said all this, however, it is difficult to distinguish Mr. 
Cameron from the broad range of criminal defendants who are faced 
everyday with the decision whether to waive their trial rights to secure 
a concession as part of conventional plea bargaining-or to distin-
guish Mr. Ramos from Mr. Brady,165 Mr. Parker166 or Mr. Alford.167 
Each of these defendants was "faced with grim altematives"168 of ex-
actly the same magnitude as Mr. Ramos, but the courts found their 
decision to waive their trial rights was voluntary.169 In short, the due 
process argument that bargaining for appeal waivers places an imper-
missibly coercive burden upon the free exercise of the right to appeal 
is really no different from the venerable argument that plea bargain-
ing in general is impermissibly coercive of waivers of the right to jury 
trial. This latter argument has been emphatically rejected by the 
Court as a necessary predicate to its broad approval of the plea bar-
gaining process.17o 
D. Should Plea Bargaining be Revisited? 
It may be time to revisit the basic assumptions underlying 
Supreme Court approval of plea bargaining. Although plea bargain-
ing currently enjoys widespread judicial acceptance and is even en-
couraged as "an essential component of the administration of 
further argue that this "take it or leave it" approach is not terribly different from the choice 
a potential robbery victim faces when confronted with the demand for "your money or 
your life." As Professor Sullivan has pointed out, "coercion involves severe constraint on 
choice rather than its elimination." Supra note 143, at 1442 n.114. Moreover, the greater 
the differential between the sentence the defendant is offered with, as opposed to without, 
an appeal waiver necessarily increases the restraint in choice and makes it more likely such 
a plea was "coerced." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System, 17 J. LEG. ST. 43, 70-74 (1988). 
163. 292 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1968). 
164. ld. at 940. 
165. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
166. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). 
167. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
168. ld. at 36. 
169. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794; Alford, 400 U.S. at 38. 
170. See supra note 169. 
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justice,"I71 the process was, through much of its history, viewed to be 
constitutionally suspect.l72 As recently as 1958, the Supreme Court 
struck down a bargained-for gUilty plea as "improperly obtained."173 
Thus, its lineage is not so ancient as to suggest that reconsideration 
should be unthinkable.174 In particular, it may be time to revisit the 
Court's central assumption that the defendant and the prosecutor are 
coequal adversaries in the plea bargaining context. Much of the law 
review commentary has disputed this assumption.175 Some have gone 
so far as to suggest that if there ever was a "mutuality of advantage" 
in the plea bargaining context, it was destroyed by opinions such as 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.176 
Furthermore, a recent but dramatic change in the plea bargaining 
landscape makes such reconsideration particularly appropriate. This 
change is the arrival in the federal system (as well as a number of state 
systems) of new determinate sentencing schemes which tilt the playing 
field significantly in favor of the prosecutor.177 This is accomplished 
by sharply increasing the penalty range for given criminal behavior 
171. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
172. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19-24 
(1979). 
173. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958). This opinion rested principally 
upon a confession of error by the Solicitor General. Id. Nonetheless, the opinion was 
widely regarded as a signal that the Court was ready to find the practice of plea bargaining 
invalid. See Alschuler, supra note 172, at 35. 
174. For arguments in general about the failings of plea bargaining, see Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). 
175. See Gifford, supra note 159, at 38-39; Malvina Halberstam, Towards Neutral Princi-
ples in the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanc-
tioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 J. CRlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 48 (1982); John H. 
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12-13 (1978); Mark Thshnet 
& Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure, 35 CAlli. U. L. REv. 361, 
366 (1986); Stephen F. Ross, Note, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuses 
in Plea Bargaining, 66 CAL. L. REv. 875, 879-880 (1978). 
176. 434 U.S. 357 (1987). See Ross, supra note 175, at 880. Bordenkircher involved a 
defendant who refused to plead guilty to forgery, a state felony punishable by two to ten 
years in prison. Id. at 358. The prosecutor then carried out a threat made during plea 
bargaining conferences and charged the defendant under the state habitual criminal stat-
ute, thus subjecting him to a mandatory life sentence. Id. at 358-59. The Court found no 
due process violation. Id. at 365. 
177. U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994) (1be 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3586 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998, created 
the United States Sentencing Commission which was, in tum, charged with establishing the 
sentencing policies and guidelines that are set forth in this manual). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 1168-1170.6 (West 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1005-8-1 to 1005-8-4 
(Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 (Bums 1991); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 70.00(2)-(3), 70.02, 70.06, 220.00-43 (McKinney 1987). 
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and transferring sentencing discretion away from the trial judge (and 
parole boards) and lodging it with the prosecutor.178 
In the federal system, the accretion in sentencing range is largely 
the result of mandatory minimum sentences, statutory changes in the 
severity of drug sentences, and the sentencing commissioners' decision 
to impose more severe sentences for white collar crimes. One federal 
judge, Gerald W. Heaney, recently attempted to measure the increase 
in sentencing in the Eighth Circuit and concluded that, although Con-
gress expected that time served under the Guidelines would, in the 
aggregate, be about the same as time served under pre-Guidelines 
sentences, in fact, an offender sentenced under the Guidelines is likely 
to serve more than twice as long as someone sentenced under pre-
Guidelines law.179 Although the accuracy of these particular figures 
has been challenged,18o there seems little doubt that there have been 
very significant increases in both the use and average length of prison 
sentences under the Guidelines.181 In fact, a recent report by the 
United States Sentencing Commission indicates that the Eighth Cir-
cuit figures compiled by Judge Heaney accurately reflect what is hap-
pening across the country in the wake of the Guidelines.l82 Moreover, 
the rush to mandatory sentencing schemes in the states represented "a 
shift to policies [which] mandated that convicted criminals be incar-
cerated, and incarcerated for longer periods of time. "183 These sen-
tencing changes-rather than an increase in crime or in the number of 
individuals in the crime-prone age group-account for the tremen-
dous rise in national prison population figures since 1970.184 
Such an increase in sentencing exposure for the accused trans-
lates directly into increased bargaining leverage for the prosecutor. 
178. See infra note 185-195 and accompanying text. 
179. Hon. Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 772 (1992). 
180. Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr. Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 795 
(1992). 
181. UNITED STATES SENIENCING CoMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENIENCING GUIDELINES: 
A REpORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPAcrs 
ON DISPARITY IN SENIENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE-
TION AND PLEA BARGAINING 56-60 (1991). 
182. [d. 
183. Jeff Bleich, Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1125, 1147 
(1989). In California, the new "three strikes" sentencing law enacted in March 1994 states: 
"It is the intent of the legislature in enacting [the following subdivisions] to ensure longer 
prison sentences and greater punishment." CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp.1995). 
184. Bleich, supra note 183, at 1146-47 (contending that America's prison population 
increased more in the ten years between 1975 and 1985 than it had in all the preceding fifty 
years combined). 
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As Professor Alschuler has noted, "A prosecutor who can threaten 
only a penalty of three years following a defendant's conviction at trial 
plainly has less bargaining power than a prosecutor who can threaten 
a sentence of twenty-five years."185 More importantly, if increases in 
sentence exposure do in fact increase the coercive potential of plea 
bargaining, then as the gap in sentence increases between what the 
accused is offered for an appeal waiver and what the defendant can 
expect without such a waiver, the waiver becomes less reliable as an 
indicator that the appeal was without merit to begin with.186 
The second way in which these new sentencing schemes have 
strengthened the prosecutor's hand is the manner in which they have 
shifted most sentencing discretion away from the judge to the prose-
cutor. At the very heart of these sentencing reforms is an effort to 
limit or structure judicial sentencing discretion to avoid "unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records. "187 The 
federal guidelines, for example, severely constrict the range of choices 
open to the judge. When one adds the effect of mandatory mini-
mums,1SS probation ineligibility,189 and other constraints on the sen-
tencing powers of the judge, very little sentencing latitude is left to the 
judge. As a consequence, the principle determinant of actual sentenc-
ing becomes the prosecutor's charging decision. This includes not 
only which offenses are charged or bargained for but also which sen-
tencing facts get to the judge and the probation department and even 
whether mandatory minimums, as well as other significant constraints 
on the judge's sentencing function, apply. 
This wholesale transfer of discretionary powers was predicted in 
the legal literature when such determinate sentencing schemes were 
first being debated,19o and it is now accepted as fact by COurtS,191 
185. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of 
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 569 
(1978). 
186. See Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 72, for a similar argument with respect to the 
coercive effect of sentencing differentials as part of plea bargaining. 
187. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 (b) (1) (B) (West 1993). Cf. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1170(a)(1) 
(West Supp. 1995) (stating that the purposes of California's determinate sentencing act are 
best served by "uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense 
under similar circumstances."). 
188. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-
6(c) (West Supp. 1995). 
189. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 462 (West Supp. 1995). 
190. William T. Pizzi, Prosecutorial Discretion, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme 
Court's Opinion in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269, 296 (1978); Al-
schuler, supra note 185; Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under 
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judges,l92 sentencing administrators,193 probation officers,194 and 
academics.195 
It is noteworthy that virtually all of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements about the fairness of plea bargaining are premised upon 
a "mutuality of advantage"l96 or "equal bargaining power"197 that is 
believed to exist between the prosecutor and the defense. By way of 
contrast, both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure198 and much 
of the lower court authorityl99 prohibit bargaining between the judge 
and the accused in large part because, in this latter situation, "the dis-
parity of positions is extremely marked."20o Indeed, it has been held 
that precisely because the judge possesses such "awesome power to 
impose a substantially longer or even maximum sentence in excess of 
that proposed ... [a] guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of 
a definite sentence by its very nature does not qualify as a free and 
voluntary act."201 
If the awesome sentencing powers of the judge are viewed as 
preventing arms-length transactions between the judge and the ac-
Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987). 
191. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he sentencing guidelines have replaced judicial discretion over sentencing with 
prosecutorial discretion."); People v. Gottfried, 462 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (App. Div. 1983) 
(Sandler, J., concurring) ("[T]he last several years ... [have] seen the power to sentence 
defendants effectively transferred from judges to prosecutors."). 
192. Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT. R. 6, 7 (1992). 
193. William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT. R. 339, 340-
41 (1991) (the author is Director of the Federal Judicial Center); Comments of Benjamin F. 
Baer, Chairman, U.S. Parole Commission in Symposium, 1 FED. SENT. R. 359 (1989). 
194. Maria Rodrigues McBride, Restoring Judicial Discretion, 5 FED. SENT. R. 219 
(1993). 
195. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Judicial Impressions of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENT. R. 94 (1989); Freed, infra note 285, at 1697; Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facing the New Department of Justice, 5 FED. SENT. R. 225 
(1993); Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of EI Paso 
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1987); Ronald F. Wright, The Law of Federal Sen-
tencing in the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term, 5 FED. SENT. R. 108 (1992); Elizabeth A. 
Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. R. 417 (1994). 
196. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. 
197. Parker, 397 U.S. at 809. 
198. See FED. R. CruM. P. 11(e)(l) provides that "the Court shall not participate in any 
such [plea agreement] discussions." 
199. See, e.g., Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718; United States ex reL Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. 
Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 n.3. 
200. Elksnis, 256 F. Supp. at 255. 
201. Id. at 254. 
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cused and if the prosecution now exercises much of this once exclusive 
power preserve of the judiciary, then perhaps it is time to revisit the 
jurisprudential decision in Brady2°2 and its progeny to approve large 
scale plea bargaining as a means of resolving criminal cases. It may 
simply no longer be acceptable to merely assume that "the accused is 
free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."203 The pressures 
brought to bear upon criminal defendants to waive appellate review of 
their treatment in the trial courts when faced with bargaining ex-
tremely long sentences which are in the virtual control of the prosecu-
tor's office raises anew the traditional due process concerns of fairness 
and voluntariness. 
Of course, the traditional wisdom is that the criminal justice sys-
tem is so completely dependent upon plea bargaining that its abolition 
is unthinkable. This was probably most succinctly expressed by Chief 
Justice Burger in Santobello v. New York,204 where he observed that 
"[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the 
States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many 
times the number of judges and court facilities."205 However, in re-
cent years a number of practitioners206 and scholars207 have chal-
lenged this assessment and have argued both that the system could 
accommodate greater reliance on trials and that plea bargaining is not 
as inevitable as we tend to assume. 
It is by no means certain who is right on this score, but we should 
not allow cynicism to prevent us from even considering policy changes 
if we feel them to be warranted. Furthermore, a reconsideration of 
the basic assumptions about the voluntariness of the process could 
lead to approaches short of a full scale abolition of plea bargaining. It 
could, for example, lead the Court to rethink its unqualified embrace 
of plea bargaining as the preferred means of caseload reduction and 
lead it to disapprove some of the harsher manifestations of the 
practice,z°8 
202. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
203. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. 
204. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
205. Id. at 260. 
206. See, e.g., David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of 1Wo Coun-
ties, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 115 (1994). 
207. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 154. . 
208. It might be difficult to reach consensus on which features of plea bargaining are 
the most harsh or coercive since the current thinking by the Court is that none are. None-
theless, this author would put at the top of any such list the practice of piling on additional 
charges when a defendant refuses to engage in plea bargaining, which was approved by the 
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Nonetheless, since the Court has shown no inclination to engage 
in such a wholesale reassessment of its basic operation principles in 
this area, the due process critique of appeal waivers must be viewed as 
highly theoretical until such time as the Court indicates a willingness 
to revisit this debate. 
m. The Public Policy Issues 
A. Introduction 
Recent case law has explored at some length the question of 
whether waivers of appeal rights are in the public interest or whether 
they "infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of 
society as a whole. "209 Although a few courts have disallowed appeal 
waivers on public policy grounds,210 the vast majority have resolved 
the public policy debate in favor of upholding such waivers.211 The 
rationales most frequently expressed in favor of such waivers are the 
need to deal with a caseload perceived to be overburdened with frivo-
lous appeals,212 the need for finality in the process,213 the view that the 
practice furthers the defendant's interests because such waivers oper-
ate as an additional bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process,214 
and the view that appeals are less necessary as a corrective process in 
this situation because the defendant's interests are sufficiently pro-
tected by the close judicial supervision of the plea bargaining process 
at the trialleve1.215 
This Article suggests that the public policy debate has been un-
duly skewed in favor of caseload concerns, without sufficient consider-
ation being given to the essential role that the right to appeal plays in 
the criminal justice system. Further, this Article explores the public 
policy arguments most frequently made in favor of appeal waivers and 
concludes that most of them do not withstand close scrutiny. 
Court in Bordenkircher. 434 U.S. at 363-64. Also near the top of this list would be the 
practice of seeking appeal waivers as a condition of engaging in plea bargaining. . 
209. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
210. State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979); Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). 
211. See supra notes 50-55. 
212. See Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775. 
213. See Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322. 
214. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 774; People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct. 
App. 1985); Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
215. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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B. Public Policy and Waiver of Rights in General 
The concept that a promise or agreement may be unenforceable 
at law because its terms conflict with public policy is one which derives 
from traditional common law principles.216 As the Supreme Court ob-
served in Rumery, "[t]he relevant principle is well established: a prom-
ise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in 
the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the 
agreement.,,217 
Although this principle may be well-established in the abstract, in 
actual application most Supreme Court decisions are decidedly inhos-
pitable to the notion that any agreement by a criminal defendant to 
waive a right-either constitutional or statutory-could be presump-
tively against public policy. In fact, as the Court observed this past 
term, such presumptions that do operate in this area are to the effect 
that all rights, including even the most basic, are subject to waiver.218 
Thus, to suggest, as this Article does, that negotiated waivers of ap-
peal rights are against public policy and that courts should consider 
disapproving them is to undertake a decidedly uphill task. 
However, recent opinions of the Court render this undertaking 
slightly less burdensome in two fundamental ways. First, the Court 
has continued to adhere steadfastly to the basic principle that all 
waiver agreements remain potentially subject to public policy review. 
For example, in the recent Mezzanatto opinion, Justice Thomas voiced 
agreement with the defense's core premise that "there may be some 
evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the 
fact-finding process that they may never be waived without irrepara-
bly 'discredit[ing] the federal courtS."'219 
Second, and more importantly, the Court has actually invalidated 
the waiver of a fundamental right on public policy grounds in at least 
one recent case. In Wheat v. United States,220 the Court specifically 
declined to enforce a criminal defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to be represented by counsel free of any conflict of inter-
est.221 The Court reasoned that to allow a defendant to be 
216. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACI'S § 178(1) (1981). 
217. 480 U.S. at 392. 
218. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 801 (approving the prosecutorial practice of soliciting 
waivers of the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 against the use of statements 
made during plea negotiations). 
219. fd. at 803 (quoting C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, 21 FEDERAL PRAcrICE & PROCE. 
DURE § 5039, 207-08 (1977». 
220. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
221. fd. at 164. 
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represented by an attorney with a conflict of interest-even where the 
defendant had waived all rights against such representation-"not 
only constitutes a breach of professional ethics and invites disrespect 
for the integrity of the court, but it is also detrimental to the in-
dependent interest of the trial judge to be free from future attacks 
over the adequacy of the waiver."222 
Thus, the issue is not whether the courts can refuse on public pol-
icy grounds to accept a criminal defendant's negotiated waiver of 
rights. That principle is clearly established,223 even though the Court 
may, in general, be hesitant to take such action. Instead, the more 
pertinent questions are how fundamental is the right that the defend-
ant is being asked to waive and whether compelling the defendant to 
decide to waive the right "impairs to an appreciable extent any of the 
policies behind the rights involved.,,224 
Accordingly, any analysis of the public policy implications of ap-
peal waivers must begin with an examination of the right to appeal, its 
importance to the criminal justice system, and the policies it serves. 
C. The Importance of the Right to Appeal to the Criminal Justice 
System 
The right to appeal in criminal cases has been variously described 
as "a fundamental element of procedural fairness,,225 and the "final 
guarantor of the fairness of the criminal process.,,226 In fact, even the 
suggestion of a judicial system where the determinations of a trial 
level judicial tribunal would be insulated from review for correctness 
would strike most people as offensive to our most deeply felt concep-
tions of procedural fairness. At the core of how we perceive our crim-
inal justice system is a basic d~trust of the awesome power of the state 
and its ability to infringe upon individual rights. The potential for 
such an abuse of power by either the prosecutor or the trial judge 
traditionally has been viewed as requiring the availability of some 
form of corrective process such as the right to appeal. 
222. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
223. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770,1782 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that the guarantees of FED. R. CruM. P. 24(c) may not be waived by an 
agreement to permit alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations). 
224. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). 
225. ABA CoMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO APPELLATE CoURTS 14 (1977). 
226. Rossman, supra note 47, at 518. 
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Although the right to appeal has not explicitly been recognized as 
a federal constitutional right,227 it is such a de facto part of our system 
that it has been described as "sacrosanct."228 In fact, it has become 
such an integral part of our judicial process that an impressive body of 
scholarship has appeared in recent years maintaining that the right is, 
in fact, an essential element of due process.229 At least one Supreme 
Court justice has expressed the opinion that "[i]f the question were to 
come before us in a proper case ... we would decide that a State must 
afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions."23o 
Such conjecture is given added weight by the Court's recent rec-
ognition in Honda Motor Co. v. Ober[f31 that, at least in certain civil 
contexts, the right to judicial review is compelled by the due process 
guarantee.232 In Honda, the Court held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judicial review of the size of 
punitive damage awards.233 In reaching this conclusion, the Court em-
ployed a line of reasoning that raises significant questions about 
whether it would continue to stick to its position in previous cases that 
the right to appeal in criminal cases is not an element of due process. 
For example, in Honda, the Court's principle focus was the de-
gree to which Oregon's failure to provide such review was a "depar-
ture from traditional procedures ... [and] relevant common law."234 
Thus, what was most telling for the Court was the fact that such puni-
tive damage awards were not only subject to judicial review in early 
common law courts but that a review of current practice disclosed that 
"[i]n the federal courts and in every State, except Oregon, judges re-
view the size of damage awards."235 
Application of this analysis to the status of criminal appeals in 
general is hardly conclusive, but it does provide grist for those who 
would argue that the issue is ripe for reconsideration. Certainly the 
227. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding that "[t]here is, of course, no 
constitutional right to an appeal"); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (hold-
ing that state has power to place tenns and conditions upon criminal appeals). 
228. Dalton, supra note 47, at 62. 
229. See supra note 47. Actually, the question of whether the right to appeal is consti-
tutional or not may be largely irrelevant for the purposes of this article because the Court 
has made clear that if a statutory right is important enough, public policy can prevent its 
waiver. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392. 
230. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
231. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). 
232. [d. at 2341. 
233. [d. 
234. [d. at 2335. 
235. [d. at 2338. 
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right to appeal criminal judgments was not an ingrained part of our 
common law history,236 and this is probably part of the reason why the 
early cases declined to accord constitutional status to the right to ap-
peal. However, the current practice is strikingly different and, in fact, 
is comparable to the one considered by the Court in Honda. Cur-
rently, the right to appeal criminal judgments exists as a matter of 
right in the federal system237 and in 47 of the 50 states.238 Moreover, 
in the three states where review is discretionary in nature,239 the pro-
cess has been swathed in such an impressive wrapping of protective 
procedures that it is difficult to distinguish it from full review as a 
matter of right.240 
Of course, the holding in Honda is limited to the question of 
whether some form of judicial review of jury verdicts is required and 
does not directly address the question of whether a traditional appeals 
process would be constitutionally compelled. Nonetheless, when one 
examines the larger policy concerns expressed by the Court-particu-
larly the need to protect against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudica-
tion241 and the problem that a guilty defendant may be unjustly 
punished242-it is difficult not to draw parallels to the criminal process 
and the right of criminal defendants to be free from arbitrary trial 
court decisions. 
D. The Purposes of an Appeal 
Although commentators have occasionally differed on the precise 
articulation of the purposes served by an appeal and their relative im-
portance, there is widespread agreement on why we have appeals, 
particularly in the criminal system. The primary purpose is to correct 
error and assure that mistakes in the lower court do not go unremed-
ied.243 But beyond that, a variety of broader "institutional" purposes 
236. For example, criminal appeals did not exist at the time the Constitution was 
adopted and Congress did not provide for federal criminal appeals until the late nineteenth 
century. Arkin, supra note 47, at 503-04. 
237. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
238. Arkin, supra note 47, at 513-14; Dalton, supra note 47, at 62 n.2. 
239. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 599.1 (1994); VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-132 (Michie 1995); 
W. VA. CoDE § 50-5-13 (1995). 
240. Arkin, supra note 47, at 513-14; Dalton, supra note 47, at 62 n.2. 
241. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335. 
242. Id. at 2339. 
243. Contrast, for example, the A.B.A. Standards, supra note 225, at § 3.00 commen-
tary at 4, and PAUL D. CARRINGTON, ET AL., JuSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976) (both of 
which point to a two-fold purpose of error correction and "institutional" review) with the 
more sweeping claims of Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAW & SOC'y REv. 629 (1980) and Dalton, 
supra note 47, at 69 n.24. 
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have been identified. These include the articulation or systematic de-
velopment of the law,244 the assurance that the law will be applied 
with some degree of uniformity to equally situated individuals,24s and 
the legitimation of the law in the eyes of the public.246 
1. Error Correction 
The primary purpose of an appeal is to review lower court judg-
ments for error,247 This "quality control,,248 function is found in most 
legal systems and is viewed as particularly important to our own.249 
The concern for accuracy of results is particularly imperative when 
dealing with criminal judgments where the right to liberty is at 
stake.2S0 
Recently, some conservative critics of the criminal justice system 
have questioned this received wisdom. For example, Justice Rehn-
quist in a speech at the University of Florida Law School derided what 
he described as our "obsessive concern that the result reached in a 
particular case be the right one," and suggested that the time had 
come to abolish appeals as a matter of right.2S1 Former Solicitor Gen-
eral Rex Lee has opined that there is nothing in the Constitution or in 
common sense that dictates that the decisions of an appellate court 
are any more likely to be right than those of a trial COurt.2S2 
Whether or not Justice Rehnquist is correct in his characteriza-
tion of our concern for accuracy in the criminal arena as an obsession, 
one commentator seems to capture more closely the essence of our 
system when he posits that before the state "officially stigmatizes a 
citizen as standing outside the law and as deserving of society's con-
demnation, [it] must satisfy itself several times over that such a judg-
244. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 3. 
245. [d. at 2. 
246. Resnik, supra note 47, at 619. 
247. Dalton, supra note 47, at 66. 
248. Rossman, supra note 47, at 519. 
249. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 2. 
250. This concern is probably best exemplified by the ancient epigram, attributed to 
Blackstone, that "It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (philadelphia, 
J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1861). Of course, this is not so much an argument for error correc-
tion in general as it is a declaration that errors which result in loss of liberty are particularly 
anathema to our Anglo-American system of justice. 
251. Resnik, supra note 47, at 605 (quoting Justice William Rehnquist, Address at the 
75th Anniversary of the University of Florida College of Law and the Dedication of 
Bruton-Geer Hall (Sept. 15, 1984) (on file at Cornell Law Review)). 
252. Resnik, supra note 47, at 606. 
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ment is warranted."253 Moreover, Solicitor General Lee's invocation 
of common sense regarding decisionmakers is difficult to understand 
if one merely compares the average caseload and contemplation time 
per case of typical trial and appellate jurists. Trial courts operate at a 
distinct disadvantage in this regard with many urban trial judges dis-
posing of as many as 100 cases per day.254 
This is particularly true of the guilty plea cases which are the sub-
ject of this Article. These cases are processed hurriedly. Close judi-
cial supervision of the process is more a matter of form than of 
substance. The files in one case are frequently being read while the 
plea formalities of the previous case are being acted out on the judi-
cial stage. Waivers of rights-if actually made in open court by the 
defendant-are done in rote, liturgical fashion.255 More frequently 
they are achieved by recourse to a check list that the defendant signs 
at the direction of his counse1.256 Factual bases for the pleas are more 
often than not the subject of stipulations between counseP57 Sen-
tencing decisions are commonly the rubber stamp approval of either a 
plea disposition or a probation report recommendation or, even more 
problematic, the hurried attempt to apply an enormously complex and 
constantly changing sentencing scheme to the particular blend of sen-
tencing factors represented by each case.258 One simple truth con-
trols: the calendar must be moved or the system will implode. 
It is not surprising then that mistakes get made. Thus, there is 
every reason to agree with Professor Resnick who suggests that "com-
mon sense" would always opt for "a decision of three people with 
time for reflection over the decision of one person with little or no 
time to think."ZS9 
253. Dalton, supra note 47, at 102. 
254. Resnik, supra note 47, at 620. 
255. See infra note 437. 
256. Id. 
257. Cases such as People v. Enright, 183 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1982), and People v. McGuire, 
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (1991), approve of the practice of establishing a factual basis through 
stipulation. 
258. The complexity of California's determinate sentencing scheme was captured by 
Justice Gardner who wrote in Community Release Bd. v. Superior Ct. (Rabreau), 154 Cal. 
Rptr. 383 (Ct. App.1979), U[a]s a sentencing judge wends his way through the labyrinthine 
procedures of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, he must wonder, as he utters some of its 
more esoteric incantations, if, perchance, the Legislature had not exhumed some long de-
parted Byzantine scholar to create its seemingly endless and convoluted complexities. In-
deed, in some ways it resembles the best offerings of those who author bureaucratic 
memoranda, income tax forms, insurance policies or instructions for the assembly of pack-
aged toys." Id. at 384 n.l. 
259. Resnik, supra note 47, at 620. 
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These concerns about accuracy which derive from the need of 
trial courts to process enormous numbers of criminal cases (particu-
larly guilty plea cases) carry over with equal force to the defense at-
torneys who are charged with the duty of protecting the interests of 
the defendants processed through these busy courts. Most of these 
attorneys are likely to be appointed, overworked, and overwhelmed. 
In many cases, they may simply be inadequate.26o This can be a par-
ticular problem in guilty plea cases which are processed quickly yet 
are likely to involve complicated sentencing issues. A recent report of 
the United States Sentencing Commission concluded that most pri-
vate criminal defense attorneys generally do not understand the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines which control the ultimate fate of their 
clients,261 and yet federal sentencing error is an issue typically covered 
by an appeal waiver. 
Thus, there is every reason to believe that there will be errors in 
the trial court which require the corrective process of appellate re-
view. Moreover, one critical empirical fact demonstrates the need for 
appeals in criminal cases-despite persistent characterization of the 
criminal appellate docket as dominated by frivolous claims, the suc-
cess rate in criminal appeals (when one includes sentencing issues) is 
frequently as high as 25%,262 and often compares favorably with the 
success rate enjoyed by appellants in civil cases.263 Even if the success 
rate were lower, at least one Supreme Court Justice has observed that 
"the reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the 
state courts, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to sug-
gest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal would expose 
them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction. "264 
a. Can Appeal Waivers Serve as an Alternative to Error Correction 
Mechanisms? 
Many of the decisions upholding appeal waivers operate on an 
assumption (often unstated) that the error correction purposes of an 
appeal are not compromised by widespread reliance upon appeal 
260. Id. at 622-23. See also Dalton. supra note 47, at 102. 
261. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 181, at 6. It should be noted that the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines present a bewildering mine field of statutory complexity. For 
examples of how even the most routine cases can raise a host of perplexing legal questions, 
see Owen S. Walker, Litigation-Enmeshed Sentencing: How the Guidelines Have Changed 
the Practice of Federal Criminal Law, 25 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 639 (1992). 
262. NCSC, supra note 29, at 8. 
263. This empirical data is explored in detail, infra, in the text accompanying notes 398 -
422. 
264. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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waivers. The belief is that in each such case the defendant will have 
entered into a voluntary agreement to forego the benefits of appeal 
and would not have done so if there were serious errors which the 
defendant felt were of greater importance than the concessions re-
ceived as part of the bargain.265 
This line of reasoning is based on two further assumptions about 
the nature of the process, each of which is open to serious question. 
The first is that the defendant is actually a free actor in a position to 
make a truly voluntary choice. This assumption was challenged at 
length in Part IT of this Article and those arguments will not be re-
peated here except to emphasize two observations. First, rather than 
entering an arms length trading arrangement where appeal rights are 
bartered for specific charge or sentence concessions, many defendants 
find themselves faced instead with a fiat requirement that they waive 
their appeal rights as a precondition to bargaining. Viewed in this 
way, appeal waivers look less like an additional bargaining chip that 
the defendant brings to the table and more like the price of admission 
to engage in the plea bargaining process at all. More specifically, 
when required in such an across the board fashion, they bear little, if 
any, relationship to the specific merits of the claim the defendant 
wishes to raise on appeal. 
Second, in those situations where prosecutors bargain selectively 
for the waiver of appeal rights, it stands to reason that they are most 
likely to do so in those cases where defendants have arguably merito-
rious appeal issues, otherwise there would be little incentive on the 
part of the prosecutor to make significant concessions. This means 
that the greater the likelihood that the defendant was deprived of fair 
treatment in the trial court, the greater will be the pressure to give up 
access to an appeal. Thus, not only do appeal waivers operate most 
coercively on those who have the greatest reason to appeal but they 
function as the worst form of screening mechanism, removing from 
the system precisely the cases we would most want appealed. 
There are additional problems with reliance upon appeal waivers 
as a substitute for the error correction function of an appeal. Principal 
among these is the question of whether the defendant is the person 
best situated to judge the strength of the issues on appeal. Presuma-
bly, the defendant is the person best situated to determine the need 
for a trial to adjudicate guilt or innocence. As the Supreme Court has 
265. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320 ("Whatever appellate issues might have 
been available ... were speculative compared to the certainty derived from a negotiated 
plan with a set sentence parameter."). 
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observed, a guilty plea constitutes "an admission of factual guilt so 
reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes 
the issue of factual guilt from the case."266 But, as one commentator 
has urged, "[n]othing the defendant could say or do ... could serve to 
certify the 'correctness' of the trial court's sentencing decision"267 or 
any other legal decision made by the trial judge that would serve as 
the basis for an appeal. 
b. The Special Problem of Waiver of Future Sentencing Error 
Reliance upon appeal waivers as a substitute for a formal error 
correction process is particularly problematic when the issue on ap-
peal is sentencing error that has occurred after the entry of the appeal 
waiver. It is very difficult to defend a theory that defendant's knowing 
calculation of the significance of the error renders the need for an 
appeal superfluous when that very same defendant is unaware of 
either the nature or the magnitude of the error at the time the appeal 
waiver is entered. 
Consequently, the issue of waiver of future sentencing error is 
potentially one of the most divisive questions for those courts which 
otherwise approve of appeal waivers. At least one state court has spe-
cifically declined to uphold appeal waivers when the issue involves 
future sentencing error.268 The federal courts, on the other hand, 
have generally upheld such waivers.269 
c. Limits of the Error Correction Rationale 
If error correction were the only purpose served by an appeal 
then the above-mentioned factors might justify the cost-benefit trade-
offs of widespread reliance upon appeal waivers. However, the insti-
tutional purposes served by the right to appeal in our criminal justice 
system go far beyond the individual interests of any particular defend-
ant. When we take into account the fact that almost 90% of all crimi-
nal cases are disposed of by guilty plea,270 then we must recognize that 
we are talking about more than whether an individual defendant 
266. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
267. Johnson, supra note 115, at 710. 
268. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451. 
269. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827; Melancon, 972 F.2d 566; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318. This 
issue is discussed in greater detail in section IV, infra, where it will be argued that waivers 
of this sort are not only an inadequate substitute for the error correction function of an 
appeal but that they also fail the test of knowing waiver of rights established by the 
Supreme Court in lohnson v. Zerbst. 
270. See supra note 3. 
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should be free to waive a particular right for sufficient inducement. 
We must confront a practice which presents the potential for closing 
the doors of the American criminal courtroom and shielding most 
criminal cases from any judicial review. The succeeding sections ex-
amine the broader institutional implications raised by such a practice. 
2. Uniform Application of the Law 
A core purpose served by the appellate process is its unifying 
function-that is, it provides a mechanism for assuring the even-
handed application of the law. Trial courts work independently of 
each other and lack the "self-regulating capacity to promote uniform-
ity among their decisions."271 It is only by means of appellate review 
that we guarantee that all courts move in a common direction and that 
an individual's treatment in the courts is guided by legal principle 
rather than the whim of an individual trial judge. This perceived need 
for consistency in the application of legal doctrine is particularly acute 
in the criminal justice system because it is a system which adjudicates 
liberty interests. Uniformity of treatment is at the heart of our no-
tions of criminal procedural fairness and, although we do not always 
achieve the goal, it is our unstinting commitment to the ideal which 
gives legitimacy to the system. 
This imperative of uniform application of the law has particular 
force in the area of guilty plea appeals because such a large percent-
age of these appeals involve sentencing issues. In recent years uni-
formity of treatment has become the touchstone of most sentencing 
schemes, and appellate review of sentences is increasingly seen as a 
key vehicle for achieving this goal. 
Although appellate review was at one time virtually unheard of in 
the sentencing process, sentencing law has undergone enormous 
change in the last two decades.272 In both the federal and state sys-
tems, the practice has evolved from one grounded in virtually unre-
viewable trial court discretion to one confined by elaborate and 
complex sentencing statutes which regulate the sentencing decision. 
Not surprisingly, most of these new statutory schemes provide for ap-
pellate review of sentences.273 
271. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 2. 
272. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61 (1993). 
273. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4037(A) (1989); 
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1260 (West 1982); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-409(1) (1986); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 51-195 (1985); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-6(a) (1990); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 
para. 1005-5-4.1 (1982); IND. CoNST. art. VII, § 4; IOWA CoDE § 814.6(1)(a) (1979); MD. 
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These sentencing schemes are the result of a nationwide reform 
movement274 whose principle goal has been to bring order to a system 
of sentencing that was previously described as being "lawless," and 
"so far unconfined that, except for frequently monstrous maximum 
limits, they are effectively subject to no law at all.,,275 A report of the 
American Bar Association noted that "in no other area of law does 
one man exercise such unrestricted power. No other country in the 
free world permits this condition to exist."276 
The response of both Congress and a significant number of state 
legislatures was to bring about a profound change in the nature of 
sentencing theory and practice. Congress passed the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984277 and a significant number of states either followed 
suit or-in the case of states like Minnesota278 and California279-led 
the way. The result was an elaborate codification of sentencing along 
the lines of two basic models: a guidelines system (often promulgated 
by a sentencing commission) which structures sentencing discretion 
tightly280 or a system of presumptive sentences for each offense with a 
narrow range of discretion accorded to the trial judge to depart up or 
down.281 
CODE ANN., CruM. L. § 645JA (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, §§ 28-28C (1981); MINN. 
STAT. § 244.11 (1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1386(c) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
401 (1990). 
274. Probably the most influential force behind this movement was Judge Marvin E. 
Frankel of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, whose book 
on the subject, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972), has been called "[aJ 
key document in the movement for sentencing reform." Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentenc-
ing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 422 (1992). Other examples of advocacy for sentencing reform 
include Daniel R. Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 
RUTGERS L. REv. 207 (1971), and AB.A PROJEO ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ApPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968). 
275. FRANKEL, supra note 274, at 8. 
276. AB.A, supra note 274, at 1-2. 
277. PUb. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3586 
(1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)). 
278. MINN. STAT. § 244 (1990). 
279. CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 1170-1170.95 (West SUpp. 1992). 
280. Minnesota was the first state to establish a guidelines system in 1978. See MINN. 
STAT. § 244 (1990). The Minnesota system served as a model for the Federal Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 as well as guidelines systems in 13 other states. See Lowenthal, supra 
note 272, at 63 n.8. 
281. California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 1170-1170.95 (West SUpp. 1992), was the forerunner here with at least six states adopt-
ing a similar model. See Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63. 
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The principle objective of this reform movement was the elimina-
tion of disparity in sentencing.282 It was this aspect of sentencing re-
form that was most instrumental in enlisting the support of individual 
legislators283 and it was this legislative intent that most frequently 
found expression in the text of the new statutes themselves,284 
With this in mind, it is easy to see how reliance upon appeal waiv-
ers contravenes the policy underlying sentencing reform. The purpose 
of such waivers is, of course, the elimination of appellate review and 
without such review trial courts once again are free to exercise the 
untrammeled discretion that led to the birth of the reform movement. 
Moreover, given the fact that reform has been generally achieved 
through the passage of extremely complex and confusing sentencing 
structures, disparity is just as likely to result from judicial error as it is 
from judicial discretion. Yet the effect of appeal waivers is to insulate 
such error from review, compounding the likelihood of disparity.285 
282. Helen G. Corrothers, Rights in Conflict: Fairness Issues in The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 38, 40 (1990); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sen-
tencing Reform: Congress and The United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REv. 291, 295 (1993); Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63; William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John 
R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S. C. 
L. REv. 495, 495 (1990). 
283. Feinberg, supra note 282, at 295; The Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress 
in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 
and The Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 
185, 187 (1993). 
284. The Federal Sentencing Reform Act states that one of the goals of the guidelines is 
"to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (6) (1988). California's 
Determinate Sentencing Law sets forth "the elimination of disparity and the provision of 
uniformity of sentences" as its declared legislative purpose. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 
(West. Supp. 1992). 
285. An alternative viewpoint has been propounded by Professor Daniel J. Freed in 
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of 
Sentencers,101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). He suggests that sentence disparity at the trial level 
reflects greater sensitivity on the part of trial judges to the full range of differences 
presented by various offenders, id. at 1728, and that appellate courts might, in fact, be 
interpreting the federal guidelines more strictly than Congress intended. Id. at 1753. This 
may be true and may ultimately provide a telling critique of determinate sentencing 
schemes. Nonetheless, even if it is true, waiver of appellate review of sentences by defend-
ants is not the solution. If appellate courts are, in fact, applying the guidelines more strictly 
than trial courts, this phenomenon is almost certainly played out through appeals brought 
by the prosecution rather than by the defense. With rare exception, appeal waivers only 
restrict the accused from seeking the corrective process of appellate review. To date the 
sole exception is United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1991), which applies 
principles of reciprocity to appeal waivers. If an accused has been sentenced unfairly by an 
overly harsh trial court application of the sentencing guidelines, it is unlikely that he will 
receive even harsher treatment at the hands of the appellate courts whose reversals, after 
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It is for this reason that Minnesota, the jurisdiction which, along 
with California, is often credited with launching the determinate sen-
tencing reform movement,286 has flatly rejected waivers of appeal of 
sentencing error as being inherently incompatible with the goals of 
sentence reform. In Ballweber v. State,z'irl the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peal found that appellate review of sentencing was an essential ele-
ment of that state's influential guidelines system and held that 
"[v]indication of the Guidelines' stated goals ... of reducing sentenc-
ing disparity, and providing uniformity in sentencing" requires a per 
se rule against waivers of sentencing appeals.288 It is the thesis of this 
article that the reasoning of this opinion applies with full force to 
every sentencing scheme which sets sentence uniformity as a goal and 
provides for appellate review of sentences as a mechanism for achiev-
ing that goaP89 
3. Articulation of Legal Doctrine 
A related but distinct function served by appeals is their role in 
the orderly development of constitutional and other legal doctrine. 
Historically, courts of appeal have been relied upon to "announce, 
clarify and harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal sys-
tem in which they serve."290 Without an appellate process available to 
the criminal justice system, some have questioned how legal doctrine 
would ever evolve in the orderly fashion which we expect.291 This is a 
concern that extends far beyond an individual defendant's desire for 
access to corrective process. As Justice Scalia observed last term in an 
opinion unanimously disapproving routine vacatur of judgments in 
cases that are settled after appeal is filed, "judicial precedents are ... 
all, are most frequently applied to unguided downward sentence departures. Freed, supra 
note 285, at 1729. 
286. Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63. 
287. 457 N.W2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App.1990). 
288. Id. at 217. 
289. This would include, at a minimum, the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
which is modeled closely after the Minnesota statute as well as the 13 state systems listed 
supra note 273. 
290. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 3. Cf. Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the 
System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 109 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 
(1984). 
291. Arkin, supra note 47, at 576. Cf. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 785 (pashman, J., dissenting) 
("The right of appeal implicates many values which transcend the immediate interests of 
the parties: indeed, appellate supervision of the trial courts and the operation of the appel-
late process as a device for fashioning new law are at the very heart of our judicial 
system."). 
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valuable to the legal community as a whole" and "are not merely the 
property of private litigants. "292 
This need for the guiding hand of appellate review is particularly 
acute in the criminal justice system because, as one commentator has 
noted, it is appellate decisions which "set forth the boundaries within 
which police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys must operate 
if they wish to conform to the rules. "293 
a. Law Articulation and Sentencing Appeal 
Guilty pleas appear prominently for consideration in terms of law 
articulation because of the frequency with which they involve sentenc-
ing issues. Just as uniformity of sentences was a major goal driving 
sentence reform and appellate review of sentencing,294 so too was the 
perceived need for a system of orderly development of sentencing law. 
The legislative history of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
for example, discloses that Congress believed that appellate review of 
sentencing would assure "case law development of the appropriate 
reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines. This, in turn, will assist 
the Commission in refining the sentencing guidelines as the need 
arises."295 Similarly, the American Bar Association Standards For 
Criminal Justice urge that one of the principle objectives of appellate 
review of sentences should be to "promote the development and ap-
plication of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just. "296 
This need for orderly appellate guidance takes on added signifi-
cance when one factors in the enormous complexity of most modern 
sentencing schemes. The federal guidelines are particularly formida-
ble,297 having been described by one commentator as being "ridicu-
lously complicated."298 In addition, they are constantly changing. For 
example, from 1988 through 1992, the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion promulgated 465 amendments to the guidelines and commen-
tary.299 State systems suffer from similar problems of complexity3°O 
292. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, No. 93-
714, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7982, *16 (November 8, 1994). 
293. Rossman, supra note 47, at 519. 
294. See supra notes 271-289 and accompanying text. 
295. S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, 151 (1983). 
296. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CruMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 20-1.2(d) (1980). 
297. Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and The Federal 
Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99, 107 (1992). 
298. Conference on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 
YALE LJ. 2053, 2060 (1992). 
299. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 107. 
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and also change with unsettling frequency,301 creating, in essence, a 
moving target for trial judges and attorneys. Without some appellate 
overlay to provide for rational development, the potential for chaotic 
application of these modem sentencing schemes is a problem of great 
dimensions. 
Appellate courts have responded to this problem with a signifi-
cant increase in the number of cases reviewing sentencing error.302 
Moreover, the response has provided some significant measure of the 
guidance one would desire. For example, the 1991 Report of the 
United States Sentencing Commission concluded that "[a] body of 
sentencing law, notably similar among circuits in most respects, has 
quickly developed. The Commission has benefitted from this evolving 
body of appellate law.,,303 
It would seem then that the right to appeal was intended to play 
an important role in defining the proper scope and meaning of the 
new sentencing statutes and that it has, by and large, succeeded in 
doing so. Widespread use of waivers of sentencing error conflicts di-
rectly with these basic policies. 
b. Law Articulation and Appeals of Suppression Motions 
In those few states which permit an appeal of a suppression mo-
tion after a guilty plea,304 such claims represent a significant portion of 
guilty plea appeals.305 These claims also represent a major source of 
trial court error. As a result, a high proportion of those appellate vic-
300. See, e.g., Diane Beale, California's Determinate Sentencing Law: Punishment for 
Defendants, Cqmplexity for the Courts, S.F. Arr'y, Aug.lSept. 1993, at 18. 
301. State detenninate sentencing schemes provide an almost irresistible temptation to 
legislators to tinker with sentencing limits-motivated usually by some shifting combina-
tion of the need to respond to crime rates and the desire to remain in elective office. See, 
e.g., Hallye Jordan, "Crime of the Month:" Sarcasm Obscures the Debate, L.A. DAILY J., 
May 5, 1994, at 7. California's Detenninate Sentencing Act has been amended more than 
1,000 times since it was passed in 1976. [d. Most recently, it was amended with a hastily 
and sloppily drafted "Three Strikes and You're Out" statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 
(West 1994), that may require years of appellate review before its conflicting provisions 
can be rationalized. See, e.g., CAL. JUD. CoUNCIL REp. TO PRESIDING JUDGES AND SOLE 
JUDGES OF TIlE TRIAL Crs. (March 18, 1994). 
302. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 1983 ANN. REp. 3, 9 ("increased appeals and increased 
error may coincide with the adoption of a new and complex [sentencing] law") [hereinafter 
Jcc-1983 REpORT]; Freed, supra note 285, at 1727 ("[A]bout 5,400 [federal] sentences are 
being appealed annually. Since sentences were rarely reviewed before the Guidelines, this 
number represents a significant addition to appellate caseloads."). 
303. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 181, at 25. 
304. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (Deering 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PRoe. LAW 
§ 710.70(2) (McKinney 1994). 
305. NCSC, supra note 29, at 44 n.8. 
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tories which defendants are able to obtain involve suppression is-
sues.306 Thus, it should come as no surprise that waiver of these 
appellate claims is frequently sought as an element of plea bargaining, 
and that some of the first cases upholding appeal waivers involved 
waiver of these claims.3D7 
Of course, in most jurisdictions this is never an appeal waiver is-
sue. Search and seizure claims are a classic example of those depriva-
tions of constitutional rights which, because they involve issues that 
arose prior to the entry of the guilty plea, are deemed forfeited by 
virtue of the guilty plea.308 It is only in states such as California3D9 and 
New York310 which have created statutory exceptions to this rule that 
appeal rights exist which may, in turn, be subject to bargains for their 
waiver. 
Given that such constitutional claims are viewed as being auto-
matically forfeited by virtue of the plea itself, it is difficult to argue 
that public policy forbids their waiver when they are resuscitated by 
state statute-unless, of course, such statutes themselves reflect such a 
policy against waiver. It might be argued, for instance, that these very 
statutes represent the considered judgment of the Legislature that 
search and seizure claims are so integral to the concept of individual 
liberty that these claims cannot be ignored simply because an individ-
ual defendant has chosen to take advantage of a bargained-for sen-
tence or charge reduction. The problem with such an argument is that 
the legislative history of these statutes suggests a more modest agenda 
on the part of the legislatures which passed them. Both California 
Penal Code Section 1538.5(m) and New York Criminal Procedure 
Law Section 710.70(2) have been found to be premised on the more 
mundane policy of protecting the public fisc by avoiding the expense 
of pro forma trials which would otherwise be required in order to pre-
serve search issues for appea1.311 
Thus, the public policy argument against waiver of such statutory 
rights is a difficult argument which has been rejected by those courts 
which have considered it.312 Nonetheless, there is a serious public pol-
icy issue lurking here. Cases upholding appeal waivers in this arena 
306. Id. at 17. 
307. See, e.g., People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Williams, 
331 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975). 
308. Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 293; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 
309. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1538.5(m} (Deering 1995). 
310. N.Y. CRIM. PRoe. LAW § 710.70(2} (McKinney 1994). 
311. Hil~ 117 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32. 
312. See, e.g., Williams, 331 N.E.2d at 684; Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
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are part of a larger trend over the last twenty or so years of removing 
search and seiZure claims from virtually all higher court review. For 
example, as previously mentioned, a guilty plea automatically forfeits 
appellate review of search and seizure claims in the almost 90% of the 
criminal caseload which is resolved by pleas of guilty.313 In addition, 
search and seizure claims are removed entirely from federal habeas 
corpus review if there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
them in the state system.314 Lastly, in cases involving warrants, the 
magistrate's decision to issue the warrant can not even be reviewed in 
the trial court, let alone a court of appeal so long as the police officer 
executing the warrant had an objective, good faith belief in its 
validity.315 
This general trend toward the removal of search issues from most 
forms of review is not inadvertent. It is a deliberate choice on the part 
of the Court reflecting a judgment that "application of [the exclusion-
ary rule should be] restricted to those areas where its remedial objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served.,,316 Thus, besides the 
previously mentioned limits on appellate review, the Court has also 
limited application of the exclusionary rule in the areas of standing,317 
impeachment,318 grand jury testimony,319 civil proceedings,320 and the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,321 to name a few. 
Without revisiting the entire question of the proper scope of the 
exclusionary rule, it does appear that there are particular problems 
with removing its operation from most forms of appellate review. At 
the very least, the complexity of these constitutional issues raises the 
very real question of whether a single authority can generate depend-
ably accurate results over time.322 Application of constitutional doc-
trine is, in general, a very difficult judicial task that is made all the 
more difficult by constantly shifting trends and countertrends that 
characterize Supreme Court guidance in this area. In this sense, it is 
313. See supra note 3. 
314. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). 
315. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). 
316. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
317. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165, 174 (1969). 
318. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walden v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 
(1954). 
319. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
320. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,459-60 (1976). 
321. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
322. Arkin, supra note 47, at 574. 
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quite different from such relatively more straightforward tasks as stat-
utory interpretation or such discretion-based tasks as evidentiary rul-
ings. The chance for error is greater and, given that these issues cut to 
the core of individual liberty, we must view with some concern the fact 
that such decision-making has been largely removed from appellate 
review. On a more pragmatic level, the political pressures upon local 
trial courts when called upon to enforce the constitutional rights of 
accused criminals during periods of public outrage over crime raise 
nagging questions about the ability of first tier courts to fulfill the 
mandate of the Constitution. As one commentator has noted: 
In the field of criminal procedure a strong local interest com-
petes only against an ideal. Local interest is concerned with the 
particular case and with the guilt or innocence of the particular 
individual. . .. While it is hard indeed for any judge to set apart 
the question of the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant 
and focus solely upon the procedural aspects of the case, it be-
comes easier in a reviewing court, where the impact of the evi-
dence is diluted. The more remote the court, the easier it is to 
consider the case in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused 
of crime, instead of a particular man whose guilt has been 
established.323 
While the current application of cost benefit analysis by the 
Supreme Court concludes that there is only marginal deterrent value 
in permitting review of suppression issues in the areas discussed, there 
is another way to view this matter. It seems quite plausible that per-
mitting waiver of appeal rights in these cases undercuts deterrence by 
diluting the effect of the exclusionary rule in the nearly 90% of the 
caseload which is disposed of by pleas.324 
Thus, it would seem that the purposes of appeals are particularly 
compromised when appeal waivers of suppression claims are permit-
ted. Of course, this conclusion takes one far beyond appeal waivers. 
If there is merit to this viewpoint, then it would require not merely 
rethinking the appeal waiver cases, but also Tollett v. Henderson and 
the entire line of forfeiture cases as they apply to suppression is-
sues.325 This is not likely to be on the current court's agenda. 
323. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 
5 (1956). 
324. For a similar argument with respect to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), 
and the entire line of forfeiture cases, see Tigar, supra note 18, at 21. 
325. An appellate court in New York has adopted a very unique approach to the public 
policy issues presented by appeal waivers of suppression issues. Ventura holds simply that 
there is no legitimate state interest in upholding appeal waivers in cases where the search 
issue is dispositive. Id. at 531-32. The court reasoned that the major prejudice to the state 
in overturning appeal waivers is the predicament of having to try a state case on stale 
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4. Legitimation of the Criminal Justice System 
A final institutional purpose of appeals is their legitimation func-
tion, that is, they serve "to legitimate decisions of the state, to dignify 
the participants, and to make meaningful the interaction between in-
dividuals and the state. "326 In other words, appeals are an essential 
part of the overall procedural structure which operates to assure us 
that the system is a fair one. It is essential that the system not only be 
fair but that it be perceived as fair. The continued willingness of the 
public to support the coercive imposition of the criminal sanction-
even in these times of increased demand for tough law enforcement-
is based ultimately on the perception that the system operates in an 
even-handed and just manner.327 
The right to appeal plays an important role in this legitimating 
process. It assures the public, rightly or wrongly, that trial court deci-
sions will be reviewed for accuracy and fairness and adds an aura of 
probity to the criminal justice process. Indeed, it can be argued that 
the current public insistence upon more and more punitive application 
of the criminal law is embraced by such a wide spectrum of the popu-
lace precisely because it is taken on faith that these laws will be sub-
ject to a review procedure that checks for aberrational applications. 
One writer has gone so far as to describe this aspect of the appellate 
function as providing a "fig leaf"328 for the criminal justice system, 
reasoning that "[r]egardless of whether appeal of right improves upon 
the efforts of trial court judges, it arguably serves to make them more 
acceptable. "329 
evidence after having relied upon the plea bargain to resolve the case. [d. at 531-32. Since 
there will be no such trial where the search issue is dispositive, the court concludes that the 
only other possible prejudice to the state is the loss of the conviction itself. [d. at 532. 
Since there is no legitimate state interest in preserving an unjust conviction for the sake of 
the conviction alone, the court reasons that there is no sound reason for upholding such 
waivers. [d. Although the reasoning of the Ventura opinion has not been adopted by other 
courts, it finds support in an earlier article written by Professor Westen. Westen, supra 
note 26. There, Professor Westen isolates a similar theory of prejudice as rationalizing 
such divergent Supreme Court forfeiture opinions as Tollett and Blackledge, and argues 
that such a showing of prejudice should be required before the state is ever permitted to 
rely upon a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal. Westen, supra note 26, at 1258. 
326. Resnik, supra note 47, at 619. Cf. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 8-9; ROBERT 
M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979) (arguing that proce-
dure is an important component of fairness). 
327. WAYNE R. LA FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42 (2d ed. 
1992). 
328. Dalton, supra note 47, at 98. 
329. [d. at 98. 
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The right to appeal may play a further legitimating role beyond 
that of reassuring the general public. The availability of a corrective 
process is instrumental in assuring defendants that their treatment at 
the hands of the state is guided by principles of fairness rather than 
the individual caprice of a given trial judge.330 When pleas must be 
made without access to appeal protections-particularly when defend-
ants must surrender such protections as the price of plea bargaining-
it is less likely that the defendant will accept his treatment as fair. 
This, in tum, makes the processes of rehabilitation and assimilation 
back into society more problematic.331 
The right to appeal thus serves a multitude of important goals, 
some specific to the individual appellant but most serving the larger 
institutional purposes of the criminal justice system itself. Widespread 
reliance upon waivers of the right to appeal undermines each of these 
purposes in a definable and substantial way. This is particularly so 
when one considers that nearly 90% of the criminal caseload is dis-
posed of by plea and the unmistakable trend is to condition increas-
ingly greater numbers of these guilty pleas with a waiver of the right 
to appeal. Thus, such waivers seriously imperil the public policy that 
underlies the right to appeal in criminal cases and should, accordingly, 
be disapproved. 
However, with rare exception, appeal waivers have not been 
found to violate public policy. Quite the contrary, they have been 
found to further public policy. How can this result be justified? It is 
time to tum to the public policy arguments traditionally made in sup-
port of appeal waivers to inquire whether they are sufficiently compel-
ling to overcome the objections to the practice and justify the 
prevailing approach courts have taken toward them. 
E. The Public Policy Arguments in Favor of Appeal Waivers Do Not 
Withstand Close Scmtiny 
As noted previously, most courts which have considered the pub-
lic policy questions raised by waivers of appeal rights have concluded 
330. Research in the social science field indicates that if a litigant receives a negative 
outcome but perceives that the process used to reach that decision was fair, the aggrieved 
party is more likely to accept the negative outcome. See, e.g., Scott Barclay & Jerry 
Goldman, Does Procedural Justice Plus Appellate Process Equal Appellate Justice?, Paper 
delivered to Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Com-
mittee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association, University of 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 1991, at 20. (on file with author). 
331. Arkin, supra note 47, at 577-78 n.3oo. 
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that public policy favors such waivers.332 The rationales developed by 
these courts can be organized loosely into four categories: (1) the 
need to protect the system from being overwhelmed by what is seen as 
an enormous number of frivolous appeals,333 (2) the need for finality 
in the process,334 (3) the belief that the practice furthers the defend-
ant's interests because such waivers operate as an important bargain-
ing chip in the plea negotiation process,335 and (4) the view that 
appeals are less necessary as a corrective process in this arena because 
the defendant's interests are sufficiently protected by close judicial su-
pervision of plea bargaining practice at the triaileveP36 
The cases tend to invoke these arguments with little in the way of 
supporting data other than citation to previous cases which have ar-
ticulated a similar view. Examination of each of these rationales in 
some detail shows that each fails to find significant support when mea-
sured against the realities of modern criminal caseloads and practice. 
1. Are the Courts Really Being Overwhelmed by Frivolous Appeals? 
The conventional wisdom is that, since there is a constitutional 
guarantee to a free appeal,337 there is little incentive not to appeal 
and, as a result, the system is awash in enormous numbers of criminal 
appeals, most of which are without merit.338 Former Chief Justice 
Warren Burger espoused such a view when he complained 'that the 
typical criminal appeal is "an endless quest for technical errors unre-
lated to gUilt or innocence" that makes a "mockery of justice" and 
undercuts the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions.339 A number of 
courts have complained about the proliferation of criminal appeals340 
and some have translated this into an issue of wasted taxpayer dollars. 
For example, a recent California Court of Appeal opinion deplored 
what it viewed as "the unnecessary burden placed on California tax-
payers and on an already overburdened Attorney General's office and 
332. See supra text accompanying notes 209-240. 
333. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775. 
334. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322. 
335. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 
405-06; Gibson, 348 A2d at 774. 
336. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
337. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
338. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5. 
339. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, 67 AB.A. J. 290, 292 (1981). Cf. MACKLIN FLEMING, THE 
PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE (1974). 
340. Gibson, 348 A2d at 775. 
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Court of Appeal by meritless and even frivolous criminal appeals,"341 
while a federal appeals court judge has complained of "squandering 
public funds for pointless briefs in hopeless appeals. ,,342 
There are really two separate components to this critique: first, 
the claim that the criminal appellate docket is expanding at an alarm-
ing rate and, second, the assertion that most criminal appeals-partic-
ularly those arising from guilty pleas-are frivolous. Each of these 
will be explored in turn. 
a. What Has Happened to the Criminal Appellate Docket in the 
Wake of Douglas v. California? 
In the period immediately following Douglas v. California's 1963 
guarantee of appointed counsel to indigent appellants for a first ap-
peal of right, the criminal appellate caseload rose dramatically.343 
This should hardly come as a surprise. Most criminal defendants who 
appeal are indigent. It has been estimated that the figure is as high as 
90%,344 although in many jurisdictions the figure is, in fact, much 
higher.345 Those defendants who may have had the resources to re-
tain counsel have often expended those funds on trial counsel. More 
importantly, most defendants who appeal are felons who have been 
sentenced to prison346-a circumstance which virtually assures that 
they will not have the ability to pay for counsel. 
Prior to Douglas v. California, such an indigent defendant who 
wished to appeal had virtually no alternative other than to pursue his 
remedies in propria persona. As daunting as this prospect might be to 
a defendant at the trial stage,347 the appellate phase with its total em-
phasis on written, legal argumentation, is even less accessible to most 
pro per litigants. Thus, it is not surprising that prior to Douglas very 
few defendants appealed; nor is it surprising that once this opinion 
341. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818. 
342. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1044 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting). 
343. In the period between 1963 and 1983 appellate caseloads increased at a faster pace 
than trial court filings, doubling every 8 to 10 years. NCSC, supra note 29, at 43 n.t. 
344. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 59. 
345. See, e.g., Letter from Ron Barrow, Clerk of Court, California First District Court 
of Appeal (on file with author), indicates that in Fiscal Year 1992-1993 of 1,195 criminal 
appeals, only 59, or 5%, had retained counsel. 
346. Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making 
Norms in a California Court of Appea~ 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543, 559 (1982). 
347. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), guarantees this right. Even at the trial 
level it is exercised relatively infrequently, perhaps in observance of the old adage that "He 
who represents himself has a fool for a client." 
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made counsel available to defendants, criminal appellate filings 
skyrocketed. 
It is contended, however, that the rate of increase in criminal ap-
peals continued to rise for a period extending well beyond what we 
might reasonably attribute to the impact of Douglas and that 
caseloads continue to rise even today.348 It is certainly true that crimi-
nal appellate caseloads continued to grow at a rate greater than trial 
court filings for the two decades following Douglas.349 This Article 
will explore the possible explanations for this below. However, since 
the early 1980's, despite perceptions to the contrary,350 there seems to 
have been a leveling off in the growth of criminal appeals.35~ In the 
federal courts of appeal from 1977 to 1987 the number of criminal 
appeals rose from 4,738 to 5,260, or a relatively unspectacular 11 % 
increase over a period of 11 years.352 In some jurisdictions, there has 
been an actual decrease in the ratio of appellate filings to trial court 
filings .. For example, in California between 1982-83 and 1991-92, crim-
inal appeals increased 38% from 5,137 to 7,114.353 But this must be 
contrasted with a 127% increase in trial court filings from 72,390 to 
164,583 over the same period.354 When measured by what was hap-
pening in the trial courts, this represents a substantial decrease in the 
rate of growth of appeals. The fact that there are, nonetheless, more 
criminal cases on the appellate docket is not the result of choices 
made by convicted defendants. It is the result of choices made by 
public officials to respond more aggressively to crime and thus funnel 
more cases into the criminal justice pipeline in the first place.355 
However, even though the rate of growth has leveled off, the ab-
solute numbers remain high. What besides Douglas v. California 
might explain this? 
348. Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, Taking the Delay Out of Criminal Appeals, 
27 JUDGE'S J. 7 (Winter 1988). 
349. NCSC, supra note 29, 43 n.1. 
350. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818. 
351. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991 557 (1992), [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS]. These numbers 
jumped dramatically with the passage of the federal sentencing guidelines, growing by 
57.9% from 1988 to 1990. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 99. The impact of 
the federal guidelines upon the appellate caseload is discussed in the next section. 
352. Id. 
353. JUD. CoUNCIL OF CAL. 1993 ANN. REp., Vol. II, at 25 and 59 [hereinafter JCC-93 
REpORT]. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
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b. The Impact of the New Sentencing Statutes 
Probably the single most important factor in the growth of 
caseload, other than Douglas itself, has been the passage of determi-
nate sentencing statutes in the federal system and in a large number of 
the states. Prior to the arrival of these statutes there were virtually no 
appeals of sentencing issues. A sentence within statutory liinits was 
viewed as generally not reviewable.356 The advent of modem sentenc-
ing statutes changed all this. In place of a system grounded almost 
entirely in discretionary decision-making, these new sentencing stat-
utes provided detailed sentencing schemes with rules that regulated 
the sentencing decision and a complexity that provided ample room 
for judicial error. In addition, these sentencing acts for the first time 
provided for appellate review of sentencing decisions as a matter of 
right.357 By permitting litigants to appeal when previously they were 
denied the right, and by simultaneously creating a system so compli-
cated it virtually invites error, it is no surprise that the number of ap-
peals has increased. 
The numbers have, in fact, gone up. In many jurisdictions, it is 
possible to look at a graph of appellate filings and identify exactly 
when a new sentencing act went into effect. For example, while ap-
peals held steady for more than a decade in the federal courts,358 a 
dramatic spike appears on the graph after November 1,1987 when the 
federal guidelines went into effect,359 From June 30, 1988 to June 30, 
1990, federal criminal appeals grew by 57.9%.360 Moreover, just over 
half of that two year increase involved appeals of sentences alone.361 
In California, where the state's Judicial Council concluded that the 
new Determinate Sentencing Act was responsible not only for more 
appeals, but also more error,362 guilty plea appeals constituted only 
13.8% of all appeals before the Act went into effect.363 Currently in 
California, guilty plea appeals average approximately one-third of 
criminal appeals.364 
356. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974); United States v. Thcker, 404 
U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972). 
357. See supra note 273. 
358. See supra note 351. 
359. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984). 
360. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 104 n.13. 
361. Id. 
362. JCC-1983 REpORT, supra note 302, pt. 1, at 9. 
363. Davies, supra note 346, at 558. 
364. Letter from Mark Cutler, Exec. Dir., Cent. Cal. App. Proj. to the author (Feb. 13, 
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter CCAP letter]. 
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This data illustrates that the new sentencing statutes haye had a 
major impact on appellate caseloads. The growth of criminal appeals 
is not the result of bored defendants with nothing better to do than 
create mischief in the criminal courts. It derives in large measure 
from these sentencing schemes which rely on appeals as a vehicle for 
achieving the larger goal of uniformity in sentencing and which are 
often so bewilderingly complex as to virtually guarantee appellate is-
sues in a high percentage of sentencing decisions. 
c. The Impact of Rapid Changes in Sentencing Law and Criminal 
Law in General 
A secondary impact of the new determinate sentencing statutes 
derives from the ease with which they may be amended. Fixed 
sentences can easily be adjusted upward with the stroke of a legisla-
tive pen. Although indeterminate schemes may also be amended, the 
fact that the ultimate sentence is determined sometime down the road 
by an administrative agency, such as a parole board, lessens the imme-
diacy of the impact of such amendments. 
This ability to make certain and immediate changes in the 
amount of time served by convicted criminals holds a certain allure for 
legislators as a sure-fire method for earning their tough-on-crime 
stripes duriD.g an election year. In fact, it is interesting to chart 
changes in sentencing law in comparison to election year cycles. Pro-
fessor Lowenthal has done such a comparison with regard to how and 
when Congress chose to enact and then change the penalty scheme for 
drug trafficking and the use of firearms.365 The enactment and 
changes in these penalty schemes corresponded directly to election 
year cycles.366 For example, one month before the 1984 elections, 
Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendment 
Act,367 providing mandatory minimum sentences for several drug of-
fenses. Two years later, in the next election year, Congress enacted 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986368 which set mandatory minimum 
sentences according to the weight of the controlled substances pos-
sessed.369 In 1988, another election year, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, toughening the mandatory minimum 
365. Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 64 n.9. 
366. [d. 
367. Enacted as a chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, § SOl, 98 Stat. 1837, 2068 (1984). 
368. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
369. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1991). 
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sentences once again.370 Finally, in 1990, when the Judicial Council 
recommended the repeal of existing mandatory minimum sentences, 
Congress responded instead to the pressure of election year politics 
and provided for additional mandatory minimums.371 
Election motivated ratcheting-up of penalty provisions is not lim-
ited to the federal branch. In California, it has been estimated that 
lawmakers (and voters through the initiative process) have amended 
the Penal Code more than 1,000 times since 1977 when the state's 
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act went into effect.372 
If the consequence of all this was merely annual changes in the 
number of years assigned as penalty to each individual crime then the 
resulting confusion might be relatively manageable. However, the 
tinkering is not limited to numbers-it goes to the very structure of 
the sentencing schemes themselves. For example, in California, the 
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act began with four different triads 
from which the sentencing judge was to pick a specific sentence de-
pending upon the severity of the crime and the individual characteris-
tics of the defendant. These have now grown to more than twenty.373 
The Act originally provided for eight enhancements which added one, 
two, or three years to the sentence, depending upon factors relating to 
the defendant or the manner in which the crime was committed. 
These have grown to approximately 110.374 To this one must add 
other basic changes in the structure of the sentencing process such as 
mandatory consecutive sentences,375 probation ineligibility,376 and, of 
course, the new "Three Strikes You're Out" law,377 all of which r..rr-
ther complicate matters. Many of these were passed in the heat of 
election year politics and are characterized by confusing or inherently 
conflicting provisions.378 
370. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 844(a) (1991». 
371. Lowentha~ supra note 272, at 64 n.9. 
372. Jordan, supra note 301, at 7. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 4500, 4501 (West 1986). 
376. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1203.06(a) (West 1994). Cf. CAL. PENAL CoDE 
§ 1203 (e) (1) (West 1994) (stating a defendant anned with a weapon is presumptively ineli-
gible for probation unless, in the interests of justice, the court makes certain findings on 
the record). 
377. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 667 (West 1994). 
378. Charles Finnie, In the Courts, Mixed Results for (3 Strikes), L.A. DAlLY J., Mar. 14, 
1994, at 1. 
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The temptation to tinker is not limited to legislative bodies alone. 
Between 1988 and 1991 the United States Sentencing Commission 
promulgated 434 amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines.379 
In 1992, the commission proposed 38 additional amendments.3S0 
Adding this element of constant revision to statutory sentencing 
schemes that were complex to begin with has resulted in a system that 
one commentator delicately described as "ridiculously compli-
cated."3S1 The consequence is that error is common among judges, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel. It comes as no surprise, therefore, 
that we have seen a sizeable increase in the number of sentencing ap-
peals in the wake of these statutory changes. What should surprise 
and concern us is the response in many jurisdictions-which is to a 
movement to curtail such appeals through increased reliance upon ap-
peal waivers.382 Restricting defendants' appellate rights as a means of 
containing caseload pressure can only result in insulating erroneous 
trial court sentencing decisions from review. Further, it has the ap-
pearance of being unfair, if not cynical. 
d. Other Factors Affecting Appellate Caseloads 
There are a variety of other factors that have contributed to the 
rise in the criminal appellate caseload, most of which are also beyond 
the control of individual criminal defendants. 
Chief among these has been the recent rise in trial court filings. 
The nation's response to crime over the past decade has been to bring 
the full force of the criminal justice system to bear, particularly in the 
so-called "war against drugs." As a result, the number of criminal fil-
ings has risen at an exponential rate. In the federal system, there was 
a 40% increase in felony criminal filings between 1985 and 1992.383 In 
California, between 1982-83 and 1991-92 superior court filings in crim-
inal cases rose 127% from 72,390 to 164,583.384 Nationwide, drug ar-
rests during that period more than doubled from 471,200 to 980,700.385 
At the same time, those people who were being charged were going to 
379. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 107 n.27. 
380. ld. 
381. Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 
YALE LJ. 2053, 2060 (1992). 
382. See, e.g., Olsen, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817. See also Haines, supra note 13, at 227; Tsimbi-
nos, supra note 11, at 4. 
383. Richard C. Reuben, Keeping Pace with Judicial Vacancies, A.B.A. J., Jul. 1994, at 
34. 
384. JCC-1993 REpORT, supra note 353, Vol. II, at 59. 
385. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 1993, June 1994, at 8. 
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prison at a much higher rate,386 a very significant factor for appellate 
dockets because defendants sentenced to prison are much more likely 
to appeal than those who are not.387 From 1980 to 1993, the number 
of state and federal prison inmates almost tripled.388 
Although the public and its elected representatives have shown 
single-minded purpose in toughening crime provisions, they have been 
less vigilant in providing the funding necessary to accomplish those 
retributive goals. With the exception of correctional budgets (which 
nearly doubled nationwide between 1986 and 1991),389 funding of the 
total criminal justice system has seen a proportional decrease during 
that same time period.390 This is particularly true with regard to the 
single most important resource with regard to caseload: the size of the 
judiciary. In California, for example, despite the huge rise in caseload, 
not one additional judgeship at the trial or appellate level has been 
created since 1987.391 As California'S Chief Justice Lucas has noted, 
"One of the fundamental principles upheld by a responsive justice sys-
tem is that the public court system must have adequate resources to 
perform its constitutional role."392 It is against this backdrop that 
public policy arguments in support of reducing dockets by waiving ap-
pellate rights have a particularly hollow ring. 
One last factor in the growth of appellate dockets should be men-
tioned, although its precise impact is difficult to measure. This is the 
establishment of intermediate appellate courts in the various state sys-
tems. Although conceived as a means of relieving pressure on state 
supreme courts,393 the establishment of such courts has often been ac-
companied by an overall increase in appellate court filingS.394 In 1957, 
such courts existed in only thirteen states, a number which had re-
mained unchanged since 1911.395 By the end of 1987, they existed in 
thirty-eight states.396 
Although the growth period seems largely to be behind us, appel-
late caseloads have certainly expanded significantly in the last thirty 
years. This growth has not been the haphazard and aimless phenome-
386. [d. at 2. 
387. Davies, supra note 346, at 559. 
388. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., supra note 385, at 1. 
389. A.B.A., THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REpORT, at ii (1993). 
390. [d. 
391. JCC-1993 REpORT, supra note 353, Vol. I, at 17. 
392. [d. 
393. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., THE GROWTIi OF APPEALS 6 (Feb. 1985). 
394. [d. 
395. NCSC, supra note 29, at 28. 
396. [d. 
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non described by some critiCS.397 Rather, it has been a rational re-
sponse to a series of dramatic changes in the judicial landscape. Chief 
among these has been the Supreme Court's recognition of a right to 
counsel on appeal; the emergence of new sentencing laws which both 
complicate sentencing and create an appellate right where none ex-
isted; and the growing volatility and severity of criminal law provisions 
in general. It is not surprising that these factors have led to caseload 
growth. However, it is unfortunate that the public response has been 
the development of a movement to curtail procedural rights and insu-
late error from review rather than support for an increase in resources 
to accommodate these changes. 
e. Are Most Criminal Appeals Frivolous? 
The public policy arguments in support of appeal waivers go be-
yond caseload numbers to broad assertions that most criminal appeals 
are frivolous.39B We are told that the system is not only awash in crim-
inal appeals but that most are so totally without merit that they 
amount to nothing more than "squandering public funds for pointless 
briefs in hopeless appeals.,,399 Again, the empirical data tells a differ-
ent tale. 
Before addressing the data, however, some preliminary observa-
tions are in order. The first is that the normative underpinnings of the 
criminal appellate process are such that one should not expect large 
numbers of reversals of criminal convictions even where arguably 
meritorious legal issues are present. As Thomas Davies has noted, the 
norms of criminal appellate decision-making are heavily weighted in 
favor of affirmance and this is true despite indicators that there are 
legal errors in many affirmed cases.400 The appellate norms to which 
Davies principally refers are the substantial evidence rule401 and the 
397. See Burger, supra note 339. 
398. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 91-96. It should be noted in passing that Rule 3.1 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure prohibit counsel from asserting a claim that is frivolous. The quoted assertions 
about the nature of the criminal appellate caseload seem to presume a level of professional 
misconduct on the part of the practicing bar that would be shocking, if true. 
399. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1044 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting). 
400. Davies, supra note 346, at 551. 
401. The substantial evidence rule maintains that appellate courts should not disturb 
lower court factual rulings as long as there is any evidentiary support for those rulings. As 
formulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Newland, 104 P.2d 778 (Cal. 
1940), before an appellate court will overturn a trial court factual determination, "it must 
be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 
evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below." Id. at 780. As applied by 
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harmless error rule,402 each of which is predicated upon broad 
precepts of deference to lower court decision-making and each of 
which strongly predisposes appellate courts to affirm criminal cases 
whether or not there has been factual or legal error below. As a re-
sult, appellate courts approach criminal appeals in an "affirmance 
mode," which creates a form of self-flllfjIIing prophecy-a tautological 
concept of frivolous appeals under which appeals are viewed as hope-
less because they are certain to be affirmed and affirmed because they 
are viewed as hopeless.403 
A second preliminary observation is that the manner in which 
one defines success is critical in assessing the merit of criminal ap-
peals. If one limits the definition to a complete reversal of the trial 
court judgment then criminal appellate success rates are quite low. 
For example, in California in 1991-92, only 5% of all criminal appeals 
resulted in a reversa1.404 However, this is a far too narrow definition 
of merit. The relief most criminal defendants are seeking on appeal is 
something far short of a complete reversal. A very significant per-
centage are seeking some form of what is loosely classified as a "modi-
fication" of the judgment and can include such diverse forms of relief 
most reviewing courts, the rule is seen as requiring acceptance of trial court's factual find-
ings unless they are virtually devoid of any support. Davies, supra note 346, at 598. 
402. Although the harmless error doctrine is formulated differently depending upon the 
nature of the underlying error, in general it stands for the principle that "on appeal from a 
judgment it is a cardinal rule that the duty devolves upon the appellant not only to specify 
the error of which he complains, but also to establish to a reasonable certainty that without 
such error having been committed, the result of the trial of the action would have been 
substantially different from that which was actually reached by the trial court." People v. 
Britton, 6 Cal. 2d 10, 13 (1936). Like the substantial evidence rule, this is a formidable 
norm of affirmance, but one which encourages affirmance in the face of legal as opposed to 
factual error. Reliance upon the harmless error doctrine by appellate courts to affirm con-
victions has increased substantially in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Innamorati, 
996 F.2d 456, 475 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Errors that the Supreme Court deems to warrant 
automatic reversal are rare."); Stephen H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak 
Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980); C. Elliot Kessler, Death and Harmless-
ness: Application of the Harmless Error Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty 
Cases-A Comparison & Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 41 (1991); Gregory Mitchell, Against 
"Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. 
REv. 1335 (1994); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
CoLUM. L. REv. 79 (1988); Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in 
Criminal Cases, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 538 (1979). The increased reliance on this doctrine 
led Justice Marshall to condemn what he viewed to be "a disturbing and increasingly wide-
spread trend among some courts to sanction egregious violations of the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error' whenever it 
appears that the accused was factually guilty." Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912, 915 
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
403. Davies, supra note 346, at 582. 
404. JCC-REpORT 1993, supra note 353, Vol. n, at 28. 
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as correction of sentencing error, vacating a conviction on a lesser in-
cluded offense or overturning one of several convictions.40s This is 
particularly true of guilty plea appeals in which correction of sentenc-
ing error is usually the most significant, if not the only, relief sought by 
the appellant.406 
While the statistics vary to some degree from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, the overwhelming message they provide is that when one fac-
tors in the full measure of what criminal defendants are actually 
seeking on appeal, their success rate compares surprisingly well to that 
of their civil counterparts. A recent study of federal appeals disclosed 
that in 1991, 13.6% of all criminal defendants in federal appellate 
courts received some form of relief.407 
Another study revealed that in 1989,11.3% of all federal criminal 
appellants obtained relief.408 Of particular interest was the finding 
that of those cases resulting in remand rather than reversal, 51 % re-
sulted in a different decision in the second proceeding.409 Thus, the 
relief obtained by criminal appellants is real, not merely symbolic-a 
fact that is significantly at odds with current assumptions about the 
frivolity of such claims. A study of criminal appeals in the Second 
Circuit from 1989 to 1991 disclosed a success rate of 19%, while civil 
appellants obtained relief in 27% of the cases during the same 
period.410 
The figures for state courts are comparable. A study of appeals 
in New York in 1984 demonstrated that 23% of defendants received 
rellef.411 In California in 1991-92, 23% of criminal defendants ob-
tained relief as compared to 36% of civil appellants.412 
Moreover, if we break these figures down and look at guilty pleas 
in particular, we again find the reality of criminal appellate adjudica-
tion to be dramatically different from its description. For example, a 
recent study of guilty plea appeals in the third and fifth appellate dis-
tricts in California showed that in fiscal year 1992-93, of a total of 714 
405. NCSC, supra note 29, at 34. 
406. Id. at 18-19. 
407. Jon o. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 629, 630 n.2 
(1992). It is interesting to note that Mr. Newman felt compelled to defend those numbers 
from criticism of the reverse sort from what we have been examining-that is, criticism 
suggesting that the reversal rate in criminal cases might be too high. Id. at 630. 
408. Arkin, supra note 47, at 515. 
409. Id. at 515 n.54. 
410. Newman, supra note 407, at 632. 
411. Arkin, supra note 47, at 516. 
412. JCC-1993 REpORT, supra note 353, Vol. II, at 28. 
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guilty plea appeals, 168 (or 24%) obtained some form of relief.413 
More specifically, of those 168 successful appeals, 38 resulted in a 
complete reversal, 89 were modified, 36 were remanded, 4 were af-
firmed with a remand on a particular issue, and one was a hybrid af-
firmance/reversa1.414 This high rate of success on guilty plea appeals-
although contrary to conventional wisdom-should not be surprising. 
Appeals from pleas of guilty are traditionally characterized by a high 
percentage of sentencing issues and other studies have shown that 
criminal defendants enjoy the highest rate of success with determinate 
sentencing appeals.415 
Finally, as at least one federal judge has observed, the drain 
which guilty plea appeals place upon scarce judicial resources is vastly 
overstated because the results of such appeals are rarely, if ever, new 
trialS.416 The vast majority of successful gUilty plea appeals merely 
require new sentencing which involves substantially less temporal and 
financial resources than do new trials.417 Moreover, sentence appeals 
themselves consume far fewer resources in that they generally have 
far shorter records and require significantly less briefing and much 
shorter judicial opinions.418 Lastly, as the California sentence appeal 
study shows, those appeals which are, in fact, without merit tend to be 
shunted out of the system at an early state of the proceedings with a 
minimal expenditure of judicial resources. In the two judicial districts 
studied, fully one-third of the sentence appeals were disposed of 
either by voluntary abandonment by the defendant or no-merit 
briefs419 by the attorney. This brings the success rate of those guilty 
plea appeals which were fully pursued on the merits closer to 35%.420 
413. CCAP Letter, supra note 364. 
414. [d. 
415. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5. 
416. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
417. [d. 
418. Johnson, supra note 115, at 711. 
419. CCAP Letter, supra note 364. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967) and, in California, People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979), an appointed attorney 
who determines that a criminal appeal is frivolous may petition the court to withdraw but 
must file a brief declaring that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. 
at 742; Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 441. This, in turn, places an obligation upon the court to 
review the record independently to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, without merit. 
Although some have complained that this process is cumbersome, see, e.g., Philip Hager, 
An Appeal Losing Appeal, May 1994 CAL. LAW. 43, in reality such Anders appeals are 
usually handled by court staff and involve very minimal briefing and opinion writing-
usually a statement of facts plus a declaration of no issues. 
420. These percentages are derived by subtracting the 236 cases resolved by abandon-
ment or no-merit briefs from the total of 714 guilty plea cases. The remainder of 478 active 
cases was then used to factor the 168 cases which resulted in some relief for the accused. 
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Thus, close scrutiny raises significant doubts about traditional 
public policy claims that the active encouragement of appeal waivers 
is a justifiable response to an appellate process that is being over-
whelmed by a glut of frivolous appeals. Criminal appellate caseloads 
have increased in recent years but for very good reasons. Criminal 
appeals, when measured by the success rate of relief sought, are no 
more likely to be without merit than are civil appeals. The reversal 
rate for criminal appeals is certainly high enough to justify Justice 
Brennan's observation that "depriving defendants of their right to ap-
peal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous convic-
tion.,,421 Thus, there is no good reason to single out guilty plea 
appeals for elimination. Moreover, even if caseload concerns were 
sufficient to justify efforts to reduce the numbers of these appeals, the 
mechanism chosen-promotion of the waiver of appeal rights-is ar-
guably the least equitable screening device because it eliminates cases 
without regard to merit. In fact, as argued earlier, appeal waivers may 
bear an inverse relationship to the merit of the underlying claims.422 
If appeal waivers eliminated only frivolous appeals then few would 
disagree that they furthered public policy. But appeal waivers elimi-
nate review of meritorious claims with equal effect and it is difficult to 
see how public policy is advanced by the removal of such claims from 
the system. Thus, the "judicial resources" component of the public 
policy argument supporting appeal waivers is overstated and fails to 
provide a convincing rationale for the surrender of the fundamental 
right to appeal. 
2. Would Defendants be Deprived of an Important Bargaining Chip? 
The appeal waiver cases assume that the availability of appeal 
waivers provides an important benefit to criminal defendants because 
the ability to waive the right to appeal increases the defendant's lever-
age at the plea bargaining table. To quote one federal judge, "Crimi-
nal defendants usually have few enough bargaining chips; sparing the 
government the time and expense of a trial and appeal is the primary 
currency in which they must deal."423 The Supreme Court has con-
cluded that it would "hesitate to elevate more diffused public interests 
above [the defendant's] considered decision that he would benefit per-
sonally from the agreement."424 As a corollary to this line of reason-
421. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 757 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
422. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127. 
423. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
424. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395. The most extreme articulation of this viewpoint is pro-
vided by Frank Easterbrook, who would define the value of all things (including personal 
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ing, it is argued that prosecutors might become wary of entering into 
plea agreements if they are consistently repudiated by means of ap-
peal.42S Therefore, it is argued that any decision to prohibit, or even 
limit, appeal waivers would do a terrible disservice to the accused. 
However, this is difficult to imagine. 
Preliminarily, it is not at all clear that the ability to waive appeal 
rights does, in fact, operate as a bargaining chip. In more and more 
jurisdictions, waiver of appeal rights is a precondition to plea bargain-
ing.426 Thus, an appeal waiver is rarely a discrete item of trade to be 
bartered for specified concessions; rather, it is the price of admission 
to plea bargaining.427 If this is true, then the danger defendants face 
from the possible abolition of appeal waivers is the inability to engage 
in plea bargaining. This is difficult to credit. In fact, it is difficult to 
believe abolition of appeal waivers would have any impact whatsoever 
because the criminal justice system is simply too dependent upon plea 
bargaining to take seriously the notion that prosecutors would cause 
plea bargaining to come to a halt simply because courts found appeal 
waivers to violate public policy. 
However, assuming that the traditional viewpoint is partially cor-
rect and that some defendants do succeed in "purchasing" specific 
concessions by proffering waivers of their appeal rights, there are still 
problems with advancing this as a policy argument in favor of appeal 
waivers. 
First of all, it is reasonable to assume that the parties would sim-
ply bargain over something else if this "chip" were no longer avail-
able. Even under the most favorable theory, the waiver of appeal 
rights is not the defendant's most powerful bargaining tool. Defend-
ants bargain with trial level prosecutors: The real benefit that a de-
fendant can offer to such an adversary is the removal of one more case 
from a crushing caseload. In other words, it is the waiver of trial that 
rights) in terms of their ability to be bargained in trade: "In [unconstitutional conditions] 
cases, people sell their constitutional rights in ways that, they believe, make them better 
off. They prefer the benefits of the agreement to the exercise of their rights. If people can 
obtain benefits from selling their rights, why should they be prevented from doing so? One 
aspect of the value of a right-whether a constitutional right or title to land-is that it can 
be sold and both parties to the bargain made better off. A right that cannot be sold is 
worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold." Frank Easterbrook, Insider 
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. 
Cr. REv. 309, 347. 
425. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 290. 
426. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
427. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (quoting the trial judge in that case as saying, "I nor-
mally insist on that [an appeal waiver] on [sic] the price of my plea agreement"). 
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is likely to be most attractive to the prosecutor who is doing the bar-
gaining; not the waiver of appeal. A different prosecutor will almost 
certainly have responsibility for any possible appeal and, while the 
trial prosecutor might have the larger needs of the system in mind, it is 
the pragmatic demands of his or her own personal situation that are 
most likely to affect how he or she sees the value of a given bargain. 
Finally, even if none of the above were true-even if individual 
defendants might be disadvantaged by the unavailability of appeal 
waivers as a bargaining tool-we should still find that public policy 
cuts against their perpetuation. That is because the long-range inter-
ests of criminal defendants in general, and the larger interests of the 
criminal justice system as a whole, are furthered by the discontinuance 
of appeal waivers. 
As Professor Alschuler observed in commenting upon plea bar-
gaining in general, "the long-range effect of a series of apparently vol-
untary transactions, each apparently 'value maximizing' when viewed 
individually, [would] be the creation of a society in which values that 
most of us hold dear would mean less than they should, a society in 
which we might not especially want to live.,,428 Phrased another way, 
even if a given defendant might benefit from the ability to bargain 
away appeal rights, criminal defendants in general will do better in a 
system where they do not have to forfeit their right to judicial review 
in order to engage in plea bargaining. Lastly, the criminal justice sys-
tem as a whole will benefit more from a policy that permits a public 
airing of what happens in the trial courts than it will from one which 
closes the doors of the criminal courthouse to judicial review in the 
name of defendants' rights. 
3. Are the Interests of Defendants Who Plead Guilty Adequately 
Protected by the Plea Process Itself? 
The cases upholding appeal waivers describe a plea process that is 
replete with procedural safeguards at the trial level and which pro-
vides many of the protections that might otherwise flow from an ap-
peal process.429 As described by the Supreme Court, "[p]lea 
bargaining takes place only under judicial supervision, an important 
check against abuse."43o As amplified by a Michigan appella~e court: 
In such proceedings, the trial judge serves as a neutral and de-
tached party to the plea negotiations and possesses an obligation 
428. AIschuler, supra note 127, at 699. 
429. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 772. 
430. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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to ensure that the agreed-upon disposition will serve the inter-
ests of justice . . .. Likewise, a prosecutor's duty is not· to enter 
into plea agreements at any expense, but to see that justice is 
served. For those skeptical enough to suggest the trial court and 
prosecutor may simultaneously lose sight of their respective ob-
ligations, we add the protection afforded defendants by their at-
torneys . . . . [T]he attorney will protect the defendant's 
interests, be those interests best served by preserving the right 
to appeal or waiving the same.431 
195 
Thus, the cases assure us that, as long as the plea is voluntary, a de-
fendant's decision to waive the right to appellate review should not be 
viewed as offending public policy. This author began his legal career 
with several years experience practicing in busy urban criminal trial 
courts. The hortatory comments quoted above strike him more as as-
pirational sentiments about how the system should operate than as 
truly accurate descriptions of how it does, in fact, function. These de-
scriptions neglect to account for the influence upon all the trial partici-
pants of the crushing caseload realities of modem criminal practice. 
A more accurate description of what goes on in these courts is pro-
vided by Professor Alschuler's description of trial judges who "look 
for guilty pleas the way that salesmen look for orders. "432 "They ... 
describ[e] prosecutors whose desire to 'move' cases, to maintain high 
'batting averages,' to keep desirable job assignments, to please influ-
ential defense attorneys, and to avoid the wrath of trial judges some-
times leads to much more generous offers than a rational vectoring of 
litigation risks could warrant."433 The articles have also described 
overburdened public defenders whose all but instinctive response to 
most cases is the guilty plea as well as private defense attorneys whose 
equally large caseloads lead them to plead virtually all of their clients 
guilty, sometimes even deceiving their clients for the sake of turning a 
fast buck.434 Even if the truth lies somewhere between these contrast-
ing descriptions, it is difficult to credit policy arguments which main-
tain that defendants who plead guilty have no need for appellate 
review because the trial court process will adequately safegua;rd their 
interests. 
Ironically, this is exemplified by much of the current case law 
concerning what will constitute a sufficient showing of voluntariness 
to uphold a waiver of appeal rights. The cases are replete with exhor-
431. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 290-91. 
432. Aischuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1114. 
433. Aischuler, supra note 127, at 690. 
434. Albert W. Aischuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. 
J. 1179, 1206-70 (1975). 
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tations that appeal waivers will only be upheld if the waiver is made 
"intelligently, voluntarily and with a full understanding of the conse-
quences."435 Trial courts are entrusted with the obligation of enforc-
ing that requirement by careful inquiry into the defendant's decision 
to waive his appeal rights and his understanding of the consequences 
of doing so. Certainly, there are trial courts which do this quite con-
scientiously. For example, the district court judge in Navarro-Botello, 
"carefully summarized the provisions of the plea agreement" to the 
defendant and personally determined that the defendant understood 
its contents and the rights he was waiving.436 But for many trial 
courts, the plea process is much more of an empty ritual. 
For example, many courts now rely on preprinted waiver forms 
which defendants must sign and which often constitute the entire ad-
visement process.437 In federal court, reliance is placed upon elabo-
rate written plea agreements which are signed by counsel for both 
sides and by the accused but which are almost always drafted by the 
u.s. Attorney. Although defense counsel may negotiate concerning 
the terms of the bargain, defense participation in the drafting of these 
plea agreements is typically only slightly greater than that exercised 
by the average consumer in the drafting of an installment sales 
contract. 
A controversy exists over whether trial judges must actually ex-
plain these forms to defendants to satisfy themselves that defendants 
fully understand what they mean or whether the judge may simply 
rely upon the fact that the defendant's signature appears on the dotted 
line. Rule U( d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
that "the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
without first, by addressing the defendant personally in ope;n court, 
determining that a plea is voluntary and not the result of force or 
threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement."438 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit has held that where the district court judge 
did not personally question the defendant about the appeal waiver 
provisions of such an agreement, the waiver cannot be upheld if there 
435. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. 1987) 
436. 912 F.2d at 321. 
437. 'TYpical of these fonns is one utilized by the Marin County Superior Court in 
northern California. This fonn reduces the entire appeal waiver advisement process to a 
requirement that the defendant place his initials next to one of 17 different numbered 
paragraphs, one of which reads "I understand that 1 have the right to appeal from the 
judgment of this court. 1 waive my right of appeal and my right to attack the final judg-
ment by any statutory or non-statutory means." (Fonn on file with author). 
438. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(d). 
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is other evidence to suggest it was not knowing and voluntary.439 The 
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that such a Rule 11 collo-
quy by the judge is not necessary when there is written plea agree-
ment.440 Many state courts agree with the Ninth Circuit in holding 
that a waiver form is sufficient evidence of the voluntariness of an 
appeal waiver without the need for any judicial inquiry.441 
Of course, even judicial inquiry itself is no panacea. Formal ques-
tioning by a judge can be just as ritualistic and litany-driven as any 
written waiver form. The reality of criminal trial court practice is 
marked by a preoccupation with moving the caseload and this is par-
ticularly true with guilty plea cases. However, no matter how formal-
istic the voir dire by a trial judge, it is more likely to flush out cases 
where the defendant does not understand what he or she is doing than 
are written forms presented for his or her signature. Thus, when much 
of the current case law fails to require that the trial judge "make the 
minor investment of time and effort necessary ... to demonstrate on 
the record that the defendant understands"442 precisely what is being 
waived, it is difficult to share the optimism of those earlier cases which 
assume that a defendant who pleads guilty has no need for appeal 
rights because the trial court process will safeguard the defendant's 
interests. 
4. Finality 
Many courts which have upheld appeal waivers on public policy 
grounds have done so by emphasizing the need for finality in the crim-
inal justice process.443 Reasoning that plea bargains accompanied by 
waivers of appeal rights enable the parties to "avoid the delay and 
uncertainties of trial and appeal and permit swift and certain punish-
ment of law violators,"444 it is argued that "bargains fairly made 
should signal an end to litigation, not a beginning. ,,445 
439. United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991). 
440. United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 582, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1992). 
441. See, e.g., People v. Castrillon, 278 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1991). Cf. In re Ibarra, 
666 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Cal. 1983). Both cases uphold reliance upon such fonns despite the 
United States Supreme Court mandate that when it comes to these sorts of inquiries, "Mat-
ters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling." McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 467 n.20 (1969) (citing Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16, 17 (6th Cir. 1968». 
442. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d at 584 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992». 
443. See, e.g., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 54; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322. 
444. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024. 
445. Id. 
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Waiver of the right to appeal does, of course, tend to serve the 
interests of finality. However, it does so at the expense of other im-
portant values. These values include accuracy and fairness of adjudi-
cation as well as the systematic and uniform development of the law 
and its legitimation in the eyes of the public-in short, the purposes 
served by appeals in general. In fact, at some level it could be said 
that the goal of finality is inevitably in conflict with the very concept 
of an appellate process. Appeals, by necessity, undermine finality-
both by forestalling the conclusive effect of trial court judgments and 
by sometimes overturning those judgments, which often has the fur-
ther effect of requiring yet more proceedings. The most efficient way 
to promote finality would be to abolish the right to appeal altogether. 
Despite the rhetoric of most appeal waiver cases, which is decid-
edly anti-appellate process, none has yet gone so far as to urge such an 
extreme measure as the abolition of the right to appeal.446 However, 
the inevitable consequence of blanket encouragement of appeal waiv-
ers for plea concessions can only be a substantial decrease if not the 
virtual elimination of appeals in those cases arising from gUilty pleas. 
Although there is substantial judicial opinion extolling this trend, 
efforts to insulate most-if not all-guilty pleas from appellate review 
are misguided. Guilty plea appeals raise significant issues. Why else 
do they enjoy a success rate approaching 25% ?447 Moreover, guilty 
plea appeals often raise sentencing issues which Congress and a 
number of state legislatures have declared should be closely regulated 
by the appellate process and which result in a high rate of appellate 
relief.448 Most importantly, even if the case for pruning guilty plea 
appellate calendars could be made, reliance upon appeal waivers as 
the screening device is the least equitable way to go about doing it. 
Appeal waivers eliminate cases on a basis which is not related to the 
strength of the underlying appellate issues but rather to the attractive-
ness of the proffered plea concessions-a factor which may often bear 
an inverse relationship to the merit of the appeal. Thus, although 
widespread reliance upon appeal waivers may serve the interests of 
finality by deterring the exercise of the right to appeal by those who 
have pleaded guilty, it achieves these ends by ignoring, or substan-
446. Chief Justice Rehnquist has urged consideration of such an approach in comments 
off the bench. These comments are critiqued, supra, in the text accompanying notes 253-
264. 
447. CCAP Letter, supra note 364. 
448. Even when guilty plea appeals raise nonsentencing issues, appellants achieve a 
significant measure of success. See, e.g., NCSC, supra note 29. This is particularly true in 
those jurisdictions which permit postplea appeals of suppression issues. [d. at 14. 
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tially undermining, a competing complex of values which provides the 
very rationale for the appellate process. 
Supporters of appellate waivers dispute this reasoning. They con-
tend that "the settlement of litigation ranks high in our public pol-
icy,"449 and that negotiated plea dispositions are a satisfactory-if not 
preferable-substitute for lengthy and time-consuming appellate reso-
lution of legal disputes. We are told that "where a defendant, with the 
participation of his attorney and the prosecutor, makes his own terms, 
understands them, and thereby brings an end to a prosecution or 
trial,,,4S0 the final and prompt conclusion of litigation is a public bene-
fit that far surpasses any that might be derived by fostering appeals.4S1 
A major problem with this approach is that it presumes that de-
fendants are in a position to make an adequate assessment of the is-
sues on appeal and that any decision they make to forego these issues 
should satisfy the court's independent interest in fair and aCCJ,Ifate ad-
judication. This assumption may make some sense with regard to the 
core question of guilt or innocence where the defendant may be the 
best person to make a factual judgment on that issue. That is why the 
Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea constitutes "an admission of 
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite 
validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."4S2 However, 
the same cannot be said for the legal issues which form the basis of 
most appeals. To this question, the defendant brings no particular in-
sight and, as one commentator has argued, "[n]othing the defendant 
could say or do ... could serve to certify the 'correctness' of the trial 
court's sentencing decision,"4s3 or any other legal decision that pro-
vides the basis for an appeal. 
The argument that the defendant's negotiated waiver of appeal 
can provide a satisfactory substitute for judicial resolution of the is-
sues raised on appeal is particularly unconvincing in any case that in-
volves waiver of future, unknown sentencing error. Many 
jurisdictions uphold such waivers, rejecting objections that it is impos-
sible to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of unknown error.4S4 
When the accused is negotiating blindly in this manner, not only is it 
difficult to accommodate the plea to traditional definitions of knowing 
449. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775 (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 168 A.2d 72, 74 (N.J. 
1961), cert. denied, 171 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1961». 
450. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 291. 
451. [d. 
452. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
453. Johnson, supra note 115, at 710. 
454. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318; Rutan, 956 F.2d 827. 
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waiver,455 but the disposition provides virtually nothing to answer the 
concerns of accuracy and fairness of adjudication that provide the ba-
sic justification for an appellate process. 
Even if negotiated waivers of appeal rights could be viewed as 
satisfying the error correction purposes served by appeals, they seem 
necessarily to conflict with the broader institutional purposes of ap-
peals. Finality is gained but only at the expense of uniformity, system-
atic articulation of the law, and legitimization of the criminal justice 
system. Individualized deal-making may sometimes serve the inter-
ests of the litigants, but it is the antithesis of uniform decision-making. 
Cases may be resolved more quickly and with greater finality through 
such a system, but brushing aside the appellate process deprives us of 
a forum for the articulation and orderly development of legal doc-
trine. Lastly, backroom trades of appellate claims for charging and 
sentencing concessions does little to reassure the public about the dig-
nity and fairness of the process. 
As the California Supreme Court observed many years ago, "the 
state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments.,,456 Argu-
ments which place finality and efficiency over concerns for accuracy 
and fairness raise basic questions about the quality of justice being 
administered. The current rush to embrace appeal waivers elevates a 
criminal defendant's desperate search for clemency at sentencing to a 
substitute for the judicial system's obligation to insure not only that 
the defendant was treated fairly, but that the system operated equita-
bly as a matter of institutional justice. The discussion of waiver of 
appeal rights has been dominated by concerns of calendar control. It 
is time to turn the debate back to issues of rights and accuracy of 
adjudication.457 
IV. Waiver of Sentencing Error 
A. Introduction 
Sections II and III of this article have developed due process and 
public policy challenges to the use of appeal waivers which, if ac-
cepted, would prohibit reliance upon such waivers in. all contexts. To 
date, these arguments have not been eagerly embraced by most courts 
which have heard them. Thus, this last section pursues the more lim-
455. Whether such a plea can withstand scrutiny under the waiver standard established 
by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), is analyzed in some detail. infra. in the text 
accompanying notes 462-479. 
456. People v. Henderson. 35 Cal. Rptr. 77. 86 (1963). 
457. See Arkin. supra note 47. at 521. 
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ited question of whether courts which approve of the use of appeal 
waivers in general should, nonetheless, disapprove of their use when 
the underlying appellate issues are ones of sentencing error. 
B. All Sentencing Error 
The first question is whether all sentencing error should be re-
viewable and, therefore, exempted from waivers. The error correc-
tion, uniformity, and law articulation purposes of the appellate 
process have been repeatedly invoked by the drafters of most modem 
sentencing schemes.458 It is for this reason that most of those schemes 
not only provide for appellate review of sentences but emphasize its 
importance to the broader goal of avoiding "unwarranted ~entence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct. "459 Thus, a mechanism such as appeal 
waivers which permits the widespread circumvention of appellate re-
view of sentences would seem to conflict directly with those policies 
and should, accordingly, be disapproved.460 
458. See supra notes 282-289 and 295-296. 
459. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994). 
460. This argument was developed at length, supra, in the text accompanying notes 249-
281 and will not be repeated here except to note that Minnesota, the jurisdiction which 
developed the first sentencing guidelines system and which has been at the forefront of 
sentence reform, has reached precisely this conclusion and has held that the policies under-
lying its sentencing system prohibit the waiver of appellate review of any issues of sentenc-
ing error. Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
With regard to waivers of sentence error under the Federal Sentence Reform Act, one 
commentator has proposed a modification of the Ballweber approach-one which would 
permit limited enforcement of appeal waivers under that act but withhold approval of 
those which are clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act. See Johnson, supra note 
115. Professor Johnson proposes that an appeal of a sentence waiver should be enforced 
except where: (1) sentence was imposed in violation of the underlying substantive criminal 
statute; (2) in imposing sentence, the trial judge considered factors that trial judges are 
prohibited by law from considering (such as race or religion); and (3) in imposing sentence, 
the trial judge committed "plain error" in violation of the Sentencing Reform Act. Id. at 
719-720. This suggested approach could potentially eliminate some of the worst excesses 
that are possible with unlimited enforcement of appeal waivers. However, there are defi-
nite limits to what it offers by way of a check upon improper sentencing choices. The first 
two factors are arguably nothing new. Even those courts which give uncritical acceptance 
to the use of appeal waivers assume that "illegal" sentences could always be appealed. See, 
e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025. 
Certainly that is what the first of these proposed exceptions contemplates and it is argued 
that the second would also come within the definition of "illegal sentences" as well. See 
infra note 476. It is the third of the proposed exceptions which would provide some con-
straint upon the use of appeal waivers in federal court that arguably does not exist at 
present. However, the standard of "plain error" is notoriously imprecise, see, e.g., 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACl'ICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (2d ed. 1982), and 
therefore provides little if any protection against the worst excesses. If we are to adopt an 
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C. Waiver of Prospective Sentencing Error 
Even if one rejects the blanket approach to sentencing error 
adopted in Ballweber, there is a subspecies of sentence error which 
courts should never allow to be waived-that is, the waiver of pro-
spective error, the contours of which are unknown (and unknowable) 
at the time of the waiver. As will be developed below, such waivers 
are impossible to reconcile with traditional concepts of knowing and 
intelligent waiver or with the basic policies that inform the right to 
appeal. 
1. Isn't all Sentencing Error Prospective? 
At one level, virtually all sentencing error is prospective when 
viewed from the vantage point of the plea bargaining process where 
appeal waivers are obtained. If the defendant has already pleaded 
and been sentenced there is nothing to bargain over and thus plea 
bargaining will inevitably precede the sentence process. The only ex-
ception might be the "packaging" of cases where the defendant ob-
tains concessions in a new case in return for the waiver of sentencing 
error that occurred in a past case. This is a rather infrequent 
occurrence. 
The real distinction that is being drawn here is not the one be-
tween future and past sentence error but rather the one between bar-
gains that involve waiver of future, uncharted sentence error and 
bargains that include a promise of a specific sentence (either in the 
form of a specified term of years, a predetermined range of years or a 
maximum term). These latter situations raise different questions and 
are explored in subsections D & E below. This section is confined to 
those situations where the defendant pleads "blind" and is asked to 
waive all possible error that might be committed by the judge after 
entry of the plea and appeal waiver.461 
approach which picks and chooses among which appeal of sentence error waivers will be 
upheld and which will not, it is submitted that the approach proposed in subsections C, D 
and E, below, would be fairer to the parties and easier to implement. 
461. Courts split quite dramatically on this issue. Some reject all notions that the un-
certainty of appellant's situation would render his waiver uninformed and provide blanket 
approval of such waivers. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 569-70; Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d at 320. Jurisdictions such as California, on the other hand, have taken 
virtually the opposite position, holding that defendants cannot waive unknown, future sen-
tencing error, at least without an explicit statement that it is being waived. Vargas, 17 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 451; Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26. 
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2. The Concept of Knowing and Intelligent Waiver 
The Supreme Court established the standard for knowing waiver 
of trial rights more than half a century ago in lohnson v. Zerbst,462 
where it held that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.,,463 This has been 
uniformly understood to mean that valid waiver of a right presupposes 
an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the contours of the right 
which is being waived.464 Most recently this standard has led at least 
one appellate court to reject an appeal waiver as being unknowing 
where the trial court did not specifically advise the defendant of either 
his right to appeal generally or of his specific right to appeal a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence.465 
In recent years, the Court has softened this requirement in con-
texts outside the formal courtroom process, particularly in the area of 
search and seizure.466 However, in those very search cases where the 
Court has departed from the lohnson v. Zerbst standard, it has em-
phasized the continuing vitality of that test as the one to be applied for 
the waiver of "rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal 
defendant in order to preserve a fair trial."467 
If there is one class of cases which has come to exemplify the 
Court's insistence upon the need for strict application of the lohnson 
standard to preserve fair trial rights it would have to be those cases 
involving the taking of gUilty pleas. Indeed, if there is anyone theme 
unifying the Court's guilty plea advisement cases from Boykin v. AZa-
bama468 to McCarthy v. United States469 to Henderson v. Morgan,470 it 
is that in order to enter a constitutionally valid plea, the defendant 
must know precisely what is being given up as a consequence of the 
plea. Boykin requires that the defendant be aware of the three essen-
tial constitutional rights being waived as part of the plea.471 McCarthy 
holds that the plea must be based on "an understanding of the law in 
462. 304 u.s. 458 (1938). 
463. [d. at 464. 
464. See, e.g., Jones v. Brown, 89 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1970). 
465. People v. Rosso, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 221 (Ct. App. 1994). 
466. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that prosecution 
need not show defendant's knowledge of right to refuse consent to demonstrate valid con-
sent to search). 
467. [d. at 237. 
468. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
469. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
470. 426 U.S. 637 (1976). 
471. These rights are the right to jury trial, the right to confrontation, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. 
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relation to the facts."472 Henderson requires that the defendant re-
ceive "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him"473 in-
cluding notice of "critical" elements of the offense.474 
In recent years there has been some disagreement among the 
lower courts as to what proof is required to demonstrate compliance 
with these requirements. For example, despite Boykin's express state-
ment that a knowing waiver of its three enumerated trial rights "can-
not [be] presume[d] ... from a silent record,"475 a number of lower 
courts have held that these rights do not explicitly have to be men-
tioned on the record to establish the knowing quality of the waiver.476 
However, these same cases emphasize that they are merely rejecting a 
talismanic requirement that the defendant engage in the ritual of men-
tioning each of these rights as part of his waiver. In each, the court 
has emphasized that the record was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
defendant was "not only aware of the rights discussed in Boykin, but 
was fully aware of the consequences of waiving them.,,477 Thus, 
although these cases may relax the proof requirements for demon-
strating that the Boykin standard has been met, they do not in any 
way retreat from the basic message of Boykin which is that the lohn-
son v. Zerbst standard of knowing waiver is fully applicable to the plea 
process. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Parke v. 
Raley478 did not retreat from the knowing plea standard established in 
Boykin. It merely created a presumption that this standard was com-
plied with in a case presenting a collateral attack upon the plea many 
years after the plea was entered.479 
Although this willingness to relax the proof requirements may, as 
a practical matter, undermine the force of the Court's otherwise firm 
insistence that lohnson v. Zerbst be given effect in the plea-taking 
472. 394 U.S. at 466. 
473. 426 U.S. at 645 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941». 
474. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18. 
475. 395 U.S. at 243. 
476. See, e.g., United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1976); Wilkins v. 
Erickson, 505 F2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974); People v. Howard,S Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (1992). 
477. Wilkins, 505 F.2d at 764. 
478. 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992) (upholding the validity of a plea despite the absence of any 
stenographer's notes of the disputed plea colloquies). 
479. A similar example of the Court's willingness to erect a presumption of compliance 
with the lohnson v. Zerbst standard is provided by Henderson. There, the Court indicated 
it might be appropriate to presume compliance with its requirement that the defendant be 
informed of the nature of the offense from its expectation that defense counsel has proba-
bly, in most cases, explained "the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the ac-
cused notice of what he is being asked to admit." 426 U.S. at 647. 
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context, it has no effect in the situation we are examining-Leo waiver 
of prospective sentencing error. That is because in such a situation we 
are not dealing with whether we can presume the sufficiency of de-
fendant's knowledge from a limited record. Instead, we are dealing 
with a total absence of knowledge on the part of the defendant. There 
is simply no way the accused can be viewed as knowing what he is 
giving up as a part of his waiver because it has not been determined at 
the time the plea is entered. Cases which emphasize reliance upon the 
total record or the advice of counsel to demonstrate the knowing qual-
ity of defendants' pleas are simply inapposite. There is nothing that 
counsel could tell defendant or that a larger record could disclose that 
would demonstrate that defendant really understood the nature or the 
magnitude of the sentencing error he was waiving because it has not 
yet occurred. Thus, under current law, waivers of this sort simply can-
not withstand scrutiny. Unless the Court is prepared to reconsider its 
:firm position that Johnson V. Zerbst controls the plea process, waiver 
of prospective sentencing error cannot be justified under the 
Constitution. 
3. The Purposes of Appeal 
Even if the Johnson V. Zerbst standard for knowing waiver did 
not present such a significant hurdle to the approval of prospective 
sentence error waiver, the policy arguments, developed at length in 
Section III above, provide a particularly compelling impediment to 
reliance upon such waivers when considered in this very problematic 
context. It is often argued-or assumed-in many of the cases up-
holding appeal waivers that despite the important role that we assign 
to the right to appeal, the defendant is always free to waive that right 
and that, in the guilty plea context, such a waiver can serve as a suffi-
cient substitute for the purposes otherwise served by the right to 
appeal,480 
With regard to the error correction purposes of appeal, one fre-
quently made argument is that the defendant can make a rational as-
sessment of his likely success on appeal and weigh this against the 
precise nature of what is offered to him by way of plea concessions.481 
If this exchange is satisfactory to the defendant, it is argued that it 
should equally satisfy the larger concerns of the system that error in 
480. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322. This argument was specifically ad-
dressed in the text accompanying notes 243-330, supra, but will be revisited here briefly 
because it is most open to question when it is directed at waiver of future sentencing error. 
481. Id. at 320. 
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the trial court not go uncorrected. Whatever attractiveness this argu-
ment might present in the abstract, it must fail in this context because 
the defendant is in no position to engage in the weighing of alterna-
tives that the argument presupposes-precisely because he does not 
know one of the essential alternatives. To uphold serious legal error 
in this situation on the ground that the defendant's assessment of the 
error can satisfy our own demand for accuracy is sheer legal fiction 
and should not be permitted. 
With regard to the broader institutional purposes served by ap-
peal, waivers that permit the court to overlook sentencing error that 
has not yet been committed at the time of the plea present the great-
est possibility for undermining the major purpose of most sentence 
reform, which is the reduction of sentence disparity and the creation 
of uniformity of treatment.482 Moreover, it is these kinds of waivers 
which would seem least justifiable to the layperson and, therefore, the 
most likely to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Thus, even if one is inclined to approve of appeal waivers as a 
general matter of public policy, permitting their use to prevent de-
fendants from appealing prospective sentencing error that could not 
be anticipated is at odds with our most basic perceptions of why we 
have an appellate review process. This particular form of appeal 
waiver should simply never be permitted. 
D. Pleas for Specified Sentences 
Assuming courts were to accept the previous reasoning and 
adopted a rule disallowing appeal waivers of prospective sentencing 
error, a reasonable exception to such a rule might be one which per-
mitted waivers of this sort where the defendant bargained for a spe-
cific sentence and received that specified sentence. When the 
defendant gets precisely what is bargained for it offends our basic no-
tions of fairness to allow that same defendant to try to improve upon 
the deal by means of appeal. 
Of course, if one's position is that all sentence waivers violate 
public policy then an erroneous sentence violates that policy whether 
the defendant agreed to it or not. But if we assume a rejection of this 
broad, per se approach and ask which classes of sentencing appeal 
waivers are most or least defensible, certainly this latter class seems 
482. For judicial articulation of this argument see United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 
478, 483 (9th Cit. 1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
Fall 1995] WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 207 
least troubling in light of the policy considerations we have been 
exploring.483 
1. Is the Issue Moot? 
A preliminary question presented by appeal waivers in cases in-
volving bargains for specified sentences is whether a defendant in such 
a situation has any appeal rights to bargain away. In many jurisdic-
tions, when a defendant pleads guilty in return for a specified sen-
tence, courts simply will not entertain an appeal484 either on the 
theory that the plea agreement constitutes a complete and adequate 
basis for imposition of the punishment specified485 or on the theory 
that the defendant is estopped from challenging its terms.486 Thus, it 
may be that such defendants simply have no appeal rights to exercise 
and courts which have struggled with the validity of appeal waivers in 
this context have overlooked a much simpler basis for resolution of 
the issue. 
2. Sentence Appeal Waivers in This Context Are Less Offensive 
The primary factor which distinguishes appeal waivers for a speci-
fied sentence from the "blind" pleas discussed previously is that they 
fit more comfortably into the lohnson v. Zerbst definition of a know-
ing and intelligent waiver.487 Here, the defendant knows precisely 
what the consequences of his plea will be. Even if the manner in 
483. Thus, it is not surprising to find precisely such an exception created in jurisdictions 
which have adopted a general prohibition against waiver of prospective sentencing error. 
California is a prime example. Although cases such as Vargas and Sherrick prohibit waiver 
of future sentencing error in general, cases such as Nguyen permit waivers which involve 
bargains for specific sentences. New York courts have similarly upheld appeal waivers 
involving specific sentences, People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992). However, 
although New York agrees with California as to the validity of these specific waivers, New 
York's disapproval of appeal waivers in general is much narrower than California's. New 
York has limited its general disapproval of sentence appeal waivers to those involving "ille-
gal" sentences. Seaberg, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 971. This latter term has been interpreted in its 
narrow jurisdictional sense and has not been read to require the invalidation of waivers of 
prospective sentence error. People v. Callahan, 604 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1992). 
484. See, e.g., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495. 
485. Olson,264 Cal. Rptr. at 818. Cf. Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 440 (repealed 1991) (de-
claring such a negotiated disposition as constituting "an adequate reason for the imposition 
of the punishment specified"). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1) (1994), which provides that 
"[i]n the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence under rule l1(e)(l)(C) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ... a defendant may not file a notice of appeal 
under [18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) or (4)] unless the sentence imposed is greater than the sen-
tence set forth in such agreement." 
486. People v. Jones, 258 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1989). 
487. See supra Section IV (c)(2). 
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which the judge actually arrives at that sentence is open to challenge, 
the defendant at least had full knowledge of what he was facing at the 
time of the plea. Therefore, the concerns addressed in the previous 
section do not apply with the same force. 
With regard to the error correction purposes of appeal, there may 
still, of course, be error. Given the complexity of most modem sen-
tencing schemes, an agreement between counsel which is followed by 
the court might still be in violation of what the law demands.488 How-
ever, when the defense and the prosecution make sentencing calcula-
tions independent of the court and when they and the court arrive at 
an agreement as to what is required, a system of checks and balances 
is created which may not provide a perfect substitute for an appeal but 
does provide many of its safeguards. 
It is somewhat more difficult to overlook the larger, systemic pur-
poses of appeal in these situations, however. Erroneous sentences vi-
olate the overriding purposes of uniformity and nondisparate 
treatment that are at the heart of most sentencing reform. The fact 
that the parties have agreed to the sentence makes no difference. In 
fact, negotiated dispositions which violate the dictates of the sentenc-
ing law present the potential for conscious evasion of these larger 
goals of uniformity of treatment. Nonetheless, we are presuming at 
this stage of the analysis that these broad systemic arguments have not 
carried the day and that courts have chosen not to disallow all appeal 
waivers of sentencing error. Thus, if some waivers are going to be 
approved, those involving pleas where the defendant got precisely 
what he bargained for are the least troubling from a public policy 
standpoint. 
3. Illegal Sentences 
Even if we give general approval to most appeal waivers in this 
context, there are a few constraints which should still apply. For ex-
ample, sentences which are plainly illegal because they exceed what 
the statute would permit should not be allowed, even if agreed to. 
Most jurisdictions follow this principle489 and this includes states 
488. See, e.g., United States v. Kuhl, 816 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1993), where counsel 
and the court agreed that a sentence of 46 months was appropriate under the federal 
guidelines. Subsequently, it was discovered that all were erroneously using a guidelines 
manual which had not yet gone into effect. (This case and its Sixth Amendment implica-
tions are discussed supra note 78). 
489. See, e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Seaberg, 541 
N.E.2d at 1025. 
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which uphold appeal waivers when the plea is to a specific sentence.490 
In addition to illegal sentences, courts should also disapprove appeal 
waivers for specific sentences when there is a claim that the judge, in 
imposing sentence, utilized a factor such as race or religion which may 
not lawfully be considered.491 As Judge Marvin Frankel observed in 
his enormously influential book on judicial sentencing practices, use 
of such impermissible criteria would "fatally infect the judgment and 
destroy its allowable character as an exercise of judicial discretion. "492 
E. Pleas for a Sentence Range Within a Guidelines System 
In sentencing guidelines schemes, a bargained plea is frequently 
made to a negotiated sentence range493 rather than to a specific term 
of years. This is particularly true in the federal system where the 
judge is prohibited from engaging in the plea bargaining process494 
and, therefore, from promising a specific sentence as part of the 
bargain. 
In a number of ways such pleas to a specified guidelines range 
resemble pleas to a specified term of years. Although the judge's 
range of sentence choice is obviously not as constrained by the terms 
of the bargain as with a plea to a specified term, such a bargain does 
place some limits upon the judge's choice and, thus, concerns about 
the knowing quality of any appeal waivers are not as great as when the 
defendant pleads completely "blind." However, what really distin-
guishes these kinds of plea agreements from the totally open pleas 
that began this discussion is the discretionary nature of the sentencing 
decision the judge makes as part of the disposition. 
490. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 143. 
491. United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 1480 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Wade v. United 
States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (even a discretionary, nonreviewable decision of the prosecutor 
not to make a substantial assistance motion under the federal sentencing guidelines may be 
reviewed upon a showing that such a refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive such 
as race or religion); Johnson, supra note 115, at 720. 
492. Frankel, supra note 274, at 76. 
493. An example is provided by the federal guidelines system. This scheme is struc-
tured around a sentencing table which is a grid consisting of two elements: the offense level 
on the vertical axis and the defendant's criminal history on the horizontal axis. At the 
intersection between each offense level row and criminal history column is a "cell" contain-
ing a presumptive sentencing range expressed in months (i.e., a range of 51 to 63 months 
for offense level 22 and criminal history category III). This is what is referred to as a 
guidelines range. The judge is expected to choose a sentence within this range. Phillis 
Skloot Bamberger and David J. Gottlieb, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
7-1, 7-5 (3d ed. 1994). 
494. FED. R. CruM. P. 11 (e) (1). 
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When a judge is choosing a specific term of years from a prede-
termined sentencing range, she is no longer expected to apply the im-
mense body of statutory, regulatory and judicially created. case law 
that is represented by the Sentencing Reform Act and its guidelines. 
Neither must she make explicit legal rulings which may be measured 
against these strict standards. Instead, the court is called upon to ex-
ercise its discretion.495 In doing so, it may consider "without limita-
tion, any information concerning the background, character and 
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law,,,496 in-
cluding "information that the guidelines do not take into account.,,497 
This is a grant of discretionary decision-making power that is dramati-
cally different from the complex, legalistic mode of adjudication that 
is required of the judge in applying the guidelines themselves. It is the 
kind of judgment that characterized virtually all sentencing determi-
nations prior to the advent of sentence law reform,49B and it is the kind 
of judicial determination that was traditionally viewed as being be-
yond the reach of appellate review.499 
Thus, so long as the judge, in exercising his discretion, does not 
apply reasons for the sentence which are facially illegal, or make fac-
tual findings that are so clearly erroneous as to implicate due process 
concerns,500 the policies underlying the right to appeal have less force 
in this arena and it may make sense to exempt appeal waivers in this 
context from a general rwe disallowing all waivers of prospective sen-
tencing error. 
1. Mootness 
Of course, there is another way to view this-and that is to say 
that a defendant who has made such a bargain simply has no appeal 
rights to waive. There is dicta in at least one recent Supreme Court 
opinion to the effect that a federal court's decision to impose a sen-
tence at a particular point within the guidelines is simply not appeala-
ble501 because the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984502 did not provide 
495. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992). Cf. United States v. Colon, 884 
F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Reed, 914 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1990). 
496. FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN. § 1B1.4. 
497. Supra note 496, comment to § 1B1.4. 
498. Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Reform and Appellate Review, 46 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 429, 437 (1989). Judge Wilkins, Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion makes precisely this point in arguing for nonreviewabiIity of such decisions. 
499. Id. 
500. Garcia, 919 F.2d at 1481. 
501. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1992). 
502. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3581, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. 
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for appeals from discretionary sentencing determinations. Much of 
the lower court authority prior to that opinion was in accord.503 
2. Pleas to a "Cap" 
It is the discretionary quality of judicial determinations made 
within a predetermined guidelines range which also serves to distin-
guish plea agreements with such a condition from plea agreements 
which are merely conditioned by a sentencing maximum or "cap." 
Sentencing decisions made pursuant to the latter kind of bargain are 
not made within a framework that calls for discretionary judgment; 
quite the opposite is the case. 
Although a "cap" places a limit on the ultimate term of years the 
judge may choose, it places no limit on the type of judgment she is 
called upon to make. Such a judge must still engage in the rule-driven 
model of decision-making dictated generally by the guidelines. Her 
discretion is accordingly limited and her sentencing determination is 
subject to the full range of statutory constraints that would be true of 
any other sentencing decision under the guidelines. This is precisely 
the kind of sentencing decision to which the right of appeal found in 
section 1342(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act was directed. Conse-
quently, bargains for appeal waivers which would insulate these types 
of sentencing decisions from judicial review should not be upheld.504 
Waivers as part of a plea to a "cap" are like waivers made in the con-
text of "blind" pleas. They increase substantially the likelihood of ab-
errant sentencing determinations and undermine the very purposes of 
sentence law reform. 
V. Conclusion 
Appeal waivers are now a dominant feature of the plea bargain-
ing landscape. Once described as uncommon, they are now actively 
encouraged and solicited as a solution to crowded appellate dockets. 
503. United States v. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dugan, 
912 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 914 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478 (lOth Cir: 1990); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550 (2nd 
Cir. 1989). In this light it is interesting to speculate why the Ninth Circuit, in United States 
v. Navarro-Botello, went to such lengths to uphold the appeal waiver in that case. The 
defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a sentence range of 15 to 21 months and Mr. 
Navarro-Botello received a sentence of21 months. Thus, the court might simply have held 
the sentence to be non-appealable under the statute. 
504. In this regard, see United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 481-83 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(Nelson, J., dissenting), where the judge adopted such reasoning to disapprove of appeal 
waivers limited by a "cap," while indicating her willingness to approve appeal waivers to an 
agreed-upon guidelines range. 
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In many jurisdictions, such waivers are a virtual precondition to en-
gaging in plea bargaining. Judicial approval of such bargains has been 
widespread. Most courts have rejected the broad due process and 
public policy objections which have been raised against their enforce-
ment. In fact, most courts have found that public policy affirmatively 
supports the practice of appeal waiver. 
Reliance upon waiver doctrine as a means of calendar control is 
troubling for many reasons. The solicitation of appeal waivers is inev-
itably tied to the adversarial goals of the parties in plea bargaining. In 
such a context, the prosecutor will be most tempted to offer conces-
sions for waiver of the right to appeal when the defendant has merito-
rious issues to raise on appeal. Consequently, the use of appeal 
waivers has a tendency to screen out those cases we would most want 
to see appealed. 
To the extent that waivers are not bargained for in this case-spe-
cific manner, the alternative is frequently an across-the-board re-
quirement that appeal rights be waived as a precondition to engaging 
in plea bargaining. Used in this way, the practice has a tendency to 
screen out both the meritorious and the unmeritorious claim on an 
equal basis. Thus, viewed as a screening device, appeal waivers are 
objectionable because they fail in any systematic fashion to eliminate 
from the appellate docket those cases we would most like to see go 
away. 
However, the issues raised by appeal waivers go beyond practical 
concerns over the effectiveness of the practice as a mechanism of cal-
endar control. Despite widespread judicial opinion to the contrary, 
the current use of appeal waivers raises fundamental issues of fairness 
and public policy. These concerns go to the very heart of why we have 
an appellate process as well as to the wisdom of our choice of plea 
bargaining as the principle device for resolving criminal cases. 
The due process attack upon appeal waivers is based upon the 
conclusion that an inevitable result of routine bargaining for such 
waivers is the placement of a heavy burden upon the free exercise of 
the right to appeal. Several traditional strains of due process analysis 
incorporate such a rights-burdening approach.sos However, none has 
ever been applied by the court to the process of plea bargaining. That 
is primarily because the court views plea negotiation as a voluntary 
process between participants of equal bargaining power v,.:herein the 
defendant is always free to reject any offer that might "burden" the 
505. See supra text accompanying notes 123-168, discussing "chill" theory, "vindictive-
ness" theory, and the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." 
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available choices-whether it be the exercise of the right to trial or the 
right to appeal. 
This view of plea bargaining is open to serious challenge in light 
of the changes which have occurred in sentencing law over the past 
two decades. The move to determinate sentencing schemes has 
strengthened the prosecutor's hand in plea bargaining immeasurably 
and has rendered characterizations of level playing fields and equally 
matched adversaries somewhat antiquated. 
However, this leads not merely to a challenge of appeal waivers 
but to a challenge of plea bargaining in general. Such a challenge 
would require the Court to revisit entirely its approval of the plea 
bargaining system. The Court has shown no inclination to do this. In 
fact, it continues to view the practice as "an essential component of 
the administration of justice. "506 Thus, although it could be argued 
that appeal waivers provide the perfect vehicle for a wholesale recon-
sideration of plea bargaining (because they move us toward an admin-
istrative system of criminal case adjudication that utilizes neither trials 
nor appeals), the argument is not likely to succeed in the current 
climate. 
The attack upon appeal waivers which provides a more reason-
able possibility of effecting change is that which is grounded in public 
policy. The public policy argument starts from the basic premise that 
the right to appeal is "a fundamental element of procedural fairness as 
generally understood in this country.,,507 The availability of appellate 
review serves to guarantee fairness by advancing several distinct pur-
poses. These include its principle function of error correction-assur-
ing that mistakes in the lower court do not go unremedied. Appeals 
also serve a variety of broader, "institutional" purposes which include 
the articulation and systematic development of the law, the assurance 
that the law will be applied with some degree of uniformity and, fi-
nally, the legitimation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the 
public. 
Each of these purposes is seriously undermined by the approval 
of a practice whose singular purpose is to entice appellants.to' give up 
access to the right in order to obtain some measure of clemency. Cer-
tainly our demand for accuracy in the resolution of criminal cases can 
never be satisfied by the substitution of a system of barter which bears 
no necessary relationship to the merit of the underlying appellate is-
sues (and which may, in fact, bear an inverse relationship to merit). 
506. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
507. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 225, at § 3.10 commentary at 14. 
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Our requirement that the criminal justice system treat all defend-
ants equally and uniformly is necessarily frustrated by a process that 
substitutes private deal-making for judicial resolution of questions of 
law. This is particularly true with the guilty plea appeals which are the 
focus of this Article. Sentencing issues dominate these appeals and 
nondisparity of treatment was the major driving force behind virtually 
all modern sentence law reform-including, in particular, the creation 
of the right to appeal sentences. Furthermore, the legitimation func-
tion of appeals is also undermined by such waivers since there is sim-
ply no longer any institutional guarantee that serves to assure the 
public, the accused or the key players in the criminal justice system 
that aberrant trial court decisions will not be allowed to go 
unremedied. 
Thus, routine encouragement of waivers of the right to appeal 
impairs the policies behind the right and should be disapproved. Un-
fortunately, most courts which have considered the matter have come 
to the opposite conclusion. They have done so by relying upon a vari-
ety of contrary policy arguments, none of which can withstand close 
scrutiny. For example, those courts which uphold the use of appeal 
waivers often assume that most criminal appeals are frivolous. The 
empirical data suggests otherwise. When one factors in sentencing re-
lief, appellants are successful in upwards of 25% of defense appeals.50s 
These figures compare favorably to the relief obtained by civil liti-
gants and raise major questions about the wisdom of cutting off ave-
nues of appellate relief. 
Although criminal appellate dockets have grown significantly in 
recent decades, most of this growth can be traced to decisions by crim-
inal justice policy makers either to expand the right to appeal, to com-
plicate criminal process or to increase the number of criminal :filings-
all of which necessarily leads to increased appellate litigation. How-
ever, these same policy makers have failed to provide the increased 
resources necessary to accommodate the effects of their policy 
choices. Thus, the system faces a calendar control problem of its own 
making, but looks elsewhere for the solution by limiting the rights of 
criminal defendants to seek appellate relief. This is not only funda-
mentally unfair but unsound as a matter of public policy. 
Advocates of increased reliance upon appeal waivers describe 
them as an important bargaining chip for defendants in plea bargain-
ing. Actual practice suggests, however, that rather than constituting a 
508. See supra text accompanying notes 383-397. 
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discrete item of exchange, surrender of appeal rights is often the price 
of admission to plea bargain. Since few would seriously contend that 
plea bargaining would cease if defendants were not free to waive their 
appeals rights, it is difficult to believe that defendants would be de-
prived of an important benefit if we chose to disapprove of such waiv-
ers. However, even if some individual defendants were disadvantaged 
by such a determination, the long range interests of criminal defend-
ants in general (and the larger interests of the criminal justice system 
as a whole) are furthered by the discontinuance of appeal waivers. 
Waiver of appeal rights is also often justified on the grounds that 
such waivers serve the important institutional goals of finality and effi-
ciency. They do so, but only at the cost of other important goals -
most notably, accuracy and fairness of adjudication. A system of cal-
endar control which relies heavily upon such a practice must ulti-
mately raise fundamental questions about the quality of justice being 
administered. 
Finally, even if one rejects both the due process and public policy 
critiques of appeal waivers and finds that their use should be approved 
in general, there is one variant of the practice which should never be 
approved-that is, prospective waiver of future sentencing error. 
Such waivers offend both our most basic concept of knowing and in-
telligent waiver as well as the policy goals behind most modem sen-
tencing reform. 
The debate over appeal waivers has been unduly dominated by 
concerns of calendar control. Appeal waivers are neither a:rational 
nor a just means of limiting access to appellate relief. More signifi-
cantly, their use illustrates the limits and ultimate weaknesses of a sys-
tem which places such total reliance upon plea bartering as the basic 
mechanism of criminal case adjudication. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, they undermine the fundamental principles that support the 
right to appeal in a system devoted to procedural justice. 
